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## Article

### Strengthening local bureaucracy : recruitment model of bureaucracy structural officials

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## Strengthening Local Bureaucracy. Recruitment Model of Bureaucracy Structural Officials

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**Abstract** *Implementation of decentralization in Indonesia does not automatically strengthen bureaucracy at the local level. Intervention to post-election bureaucracy is prevalent in various regions of Indonesia, particularly in the recruitment of bureaucratic elites conducted by regional heads as happened in Mandailing Natal District. This study aims to create a model that can strengthen the bureaucracy of intervention by the regional heads in placing bureaucratic elite officials. This study uses a qualitative approach. The data obtained in the form of a written document, in-depth interviews with 30 people and observation. The findings that can be used as models in this study are in addition to using existing rules, also strengthened by the involvement of civil society in the process of recruitment of elite officials of the bureaucracy. This model elaborates the paradigm of New Public Service (NPS) in the recruitment process of elite bureaucratic officials at the local level.*

**Key words** Strengthening bureaucracy, recruitment, bureaucratic elites, NPS

**JEL Codes:** D73, H75, L38, R58

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### 1. Introduction

The expansion of democracy at the local level, characterized by competition through direct local elections, also gave rise to increasingly fierce competition among political actors at the local level. The tight competition to gain the power often involves bureaucracy in the political process. The current phenomenon that often occurs in many regions in Indonesia is the politicization of the bureaucracy done by the political actors at the local level that are rampant pre and post election. Many previous studies have uncovered the political intervention of post-election bureaucracy, where post-election many new local oligarchies are created or often referred to as 'local strongmen' who politicize the bureaucracy, especially in terms of recruitment of elite positions in local bureaucratic organizations. Some areas such as Banten, South Sulawesi, Batam City and East Sumba regency and other regions showed similar pattern when the 'local strongman' won the seat of power. They tried to co-opt the bureaucracy as a government machine in order to achieve its political and economic goals. Thus in line with the opinion of Vedi R. Hadiz that post-new order occurred the transfer of political dynasties that exist in the center to the region and in fact real decentralization has been hijacked by the interests of predators or local exploiters, the phenomenon is not only happening in Indonesia but also in the Philippines and Thailand (Hadiz, 2010).

Given the study of the relationship between bureaucracy and politics, there is a conclusion that it is difficult to separate the two firmly. Political space is the activity space of people who behave and act politically (consist of people acting politically). This activity is politically organized by interest groups that try to influence the government to take and implement a policy and actions to uplift its interests and override the interests of other groups. Direct or indirect government bureaucracy will always be in contact with interest groups in society, which means it will always come into contact with that political space (Albrow, 1970). In the context of government in Indonesia, the executive leader in relationships with his subordinate, established unit, ie bureaucracy, has at least some interests, first is current survival, they must be able to survive in their position until their term is ended, the two effective governments in which they must govern effectively, sustainable economic development and achievements that enable voters to vote them back in the next election, and third is the creation of loyal machine where executives need to create political organizations with high personal loyalty (Istianto, 2013).

With the existing interests of the head of the region is very interested to keep all bureaucratic apparatus under it have loyalty to the head of the region. This condition resulted in bureaucratic tend to bend and obey the head of the region rather than performing their functions professionally. The issue of recruitment to positions that become the full rights of the regional head is also a consideration of the bureaucratic apparatus to always keep the interests of the regional head (Muda *et al.*, 2014; Dalimunthe *et al.*, 2015; Nurzaimah *et al.*, 2016; Lubis *et al.*, 2016; Nurlina and Muda, 2017; Yahya *et al.*, 2017 and Muda *et al.*, 2018). From the side of the regional head, the recruitment of bureaucratic positions can not be separated from their calculations of the maintenance of these three interests.

Ideally, regional heads should be able to maintain their neutrality in determining bureaucracy positions in accordance with existing bureaucratic principles, namely professionalism, merit system, tiered, impersonal and others (Siswadi, 2012).

However, with the direct election of regional heads demanding that regional heads have to maintain the loyalty of their constituents, the determination of bureaucratic positions is often a tool to get the head of the region closer to the community through the program. In addition to the massive politicization of bureaucracy in the contestation of regional head elections, regional heads tend to make bureaucratic positions as a concession to the loyalty of supporters bureaucrats during the election of regional heads took place. This tends to ignore the principles of the ideal bureaucracy in the determination of office. In this case the bureaucracy can be recognized in two respects: the concession of office becomes logical to the supportive bureaucrats and also the dismissal of office against the bureaucrat who does not support the winning regional head in the election.

On the other hand, the Indonesian bureaucracy is known to be patron-client resulting in the tendency of officers who pursue a bureaucratic career has no power to deal with political officials who become leaders. So that the bureaucracy apparatus can not defy the regional head who is the leader of the bureaucracy apparatus if in determining the recruitment of office still colored by the influence of 'like or dislike'; tendentious; or more concerned with 'kinship' interests. Here it can be interpreted that the concept of capability and competence will be ruled out and the bureaucratic apparatus can only accept as a result of the patron-client concept. The problem of the pattern of relationship between bureaucracy and politics after direct regional head election in Indonesia reflects the still unfolding of bureaucratic reform.

In the process of electing the head of the region is often encountered a crossing or meeting of interests between the bureaucracy and the candidates for the regional head in the election stage. This will continue when a regional head has been elected, the regional bureaucratic structure will change according to the interests of the elected regional head. This is where the issue when the interests of the head of the region against the bureaucracy is not based on the principles of the ideal bureaucracy and modern, so that frequent changes and shifts of structural positions in the bureaucracy not in accordance with the principles of propriety and ethics bureaucracy.

One obvious example of the enforcement of bureaucratic principles that are not ideal and more like or dislike is what happened after the elections in Mandailing Natal Regency. At the beginning of the leadership of Hidayat Batubara as the Regent of Mandailing Natal Regency shows the pattern of relationship between bureaucracy and politics in the context of recruitment of bureaucratic office is more inclined to the Regent's political interests than to follow the rules of rank and position that exist in the ideal bureaucratic system. The position of the Regional Head as a political official is seen to be used to interfere with the Baperjakat (the position and rank consideration board) working mechanism in determining the structural position of the bureaucracy. Looking at the post-election case in Mandailing Natal, the authors found that people recruited for important positions in the bureaucracy came from close family relatives and also other officers who were recruited pragmatically through buying and selling positions.

The appointment of the Regional Secretary conducted by the Regent is considered a violation of the rules because at the time of the appointment of the Regional Secretary, there are still some bureaucrats who have seniority and sufficient conditions to be the Regional Secretary but not appointed by the Regent. This resulted in an unhealthy climate in the body of bureaucracy which is actually based on seniority and appropriateness in terms of experience, administrative requirements and career ladder. In addition, some bureaucratic officials who had previously been dismissed from office due to partisanship in the election process of the head of the region were re-appointed to a higher position. Some echelon II level officials were also appointed not to adopt rank standards, and vice versa some echelon II officials were also dismissed from their posts and placed at levels not in line with their rank. This has resulted in an unhealthy bureaucracy that should be based on professionalism, meritocracy and career suitability.

Recruitment of the Regional Secretary and some Heads of Service in the Mandailing Natal Regency by the newly elected leader as a Regent is a clear picture of the intervention of political interest in the bureaucratic structure. The appointment of officials regardless of their rank and seniority as well as competence is an act that can undermine the hierarchical and tiered bureaucratic order of the career. Ideal principles in the bureaucratic order tend to be ignored by the Regent in determining the bureaucratic office in Mandailing Natal Regency.

The intervention of the political official occurred easily because under current employment law placed the regional head as a staffing officer at the local level. Although in other legislation rules governed the appointment of civil servants in bureaucratic positions, but the authority to make the appointment is full to the head of the region. Similarly, Baperjakat is an institution that has the authority to organize and nominate the names of bureaucratic officials who will be promoted to higher positions, but members of Baperjakat itself is a bureaucratic official whose career and placement in the position is also determined by the head of the region making it difficult for Baperjakat members to act neutral and carry out neutral assessment and proposal procedures of the intervention and the interests of officials. This review will analyze the efforts to strengthen the local bureaucracy from the intervention of political officials.

## 2. Literature review

### 2.1. Bureaucracy Theory

The bureaucracy deals with the ideally organized social organization. Bureaucracy is achieved through the formalization of rules, structures, and processes within the organization. Classical theorists such as Fayol (1949), Taylor (1911), and Weber (1948) in Albrow (1970), for many years have supported the bureaucratic model in order to improve the effectiveness of organizational administration. Max Weber is a figure known as the father of bureaucracy. According to Weber (1948) in Haldan (2011), the ideal bureaucratic organization includes eight structural characteristics. First, standardized rules, regulations, and procedures and direction of the actions of members of the organization in achieving the task of the organization. Weber describes the development of a set of rules and specific guidelines for planning organizational tasks and activities. Second, the specialization of the member role of the organization provides an opportunity for the division of workers to simplify the worker's activities in accomplishing complicated tasks. By breaking down complex tasks into the specific activity, the productivity of the workforce can be improved. Third, the hierarchy of the formal organizational authority and the legitimacy of the roles of the powers of organizational members is based on the expertise of individual office holders, helping to direct intra-personal relationships between members of the organization to complete organizational tasks.

Fourth, the work of qualified personnel is based on their technical ability and ability to perform the tasks assigned to them. Managers should evaluate the applicant's requirements logically, and qualified individuals may be given the opportunity to do their job for the company. Fifth, being able to exchange personnel in responsible organizational roles enables organizational activity to be completed by different individuals. This exchange rate emphasizes the importance of relative organizational tasks for comparison with members of specific organizations performing their duties-their duties. Sixth, impersonality and professionalism in intra-personnel relationships among members of the organization direct individuals into the performance of organizational tasks. In principle, organizational members should concentrate on the organization's goals and prioritize their own goals and needs. Again, this highlights the high priority of organizational tasks in comparison with the low priorities of individual organizational members (Rasdianto *et al.*, 2014; Suriadi *et al.*, 2015; Sihombing *et al.*, 2015; Muda and Dharsuky., 2015; Tarmizi *et al.*, 2016; Sirojuzilam *et al.*, 2017 and Hasan *et al.*, 2017). Detailed job descriptions should be given to all members of the organization as the outline of formal tasks and responsibilities. Workers should have a clear understanding of the company's desire for performance. Rationality and predictability in organizational activity and achievement of organizational goals help to improve the stability of the company. According to its basic principles, the organization must be run with logical and predictable pruning rules and guidelines.

### 2.2. Recruitment Model

Recruitment is the process of finding, finding, inviting and assigning a number of people from within and from outside the institution as a potential employee with certain characteristics as specified in human resource planning (Muda *et al.*, 2017; Sirojuzilam *et al.*, 2017; Lubis *et al.*, 2017; Sihombing *et al.*, 2017). The general purpose of recruitment is to provide a number of eligible employees for the institution. The part or unit that normally takes care of HR is the human resources department or human resource department. Recruitment sources are divided into internal resources, namely promotion, transfer, job rotation, execution and retrieval, and external sources i.e. walk-in applicants, labor bureaus, other institution, associations and trade unions, school. There are 7 steps in the recruitment process, i.e. careful recruitment needs through staffing, meticulous each job and working conditions or employment, specify job specifications, meticulously sourcing applicants, select recruitment methods, review application forms and resumes, prepare a short list of qualified applicants. Recruitment methods: from within the organization or from employees themselves, from applicants who do not apply, employees' friends, through print and electronic media, through campuses, employment agencies. Quite a few companies in Indonesia are using the services of psychology scholars to carry out psychological examinations (popularly known as psychotestes) to prospective workers applying for certain jobs in the course of employment selection. The general things that need to be evaluated are the following: number of applicants, market quality, cost per applicant being recruited, time required.

## 3. Methodology of research

The study was conducted in Mandailing Natal Regency, North Sumatera Province. The method used was qualitative. The data obtained which are in the form of written document and the results of in-depth interviews to 30 respondents and observations, and will be analyzed using qualitative analysis of typology technique (Bogdan and Steven, 1993; Lofland, 1971, Achmad *et al.*, 2017; Badaruddin *et al.*, 2017). This research uses three data collection techniques. First, the use of documentation to examine the existing data, either in the form of policy documents, papers, journals, or books of previous

research results that are relevant to local political dynamics in North Sumatra and are linked to the bureaucracy. Second, in-depth interviews. The data are also described and analyzed through the technique of in-depth interviews with 30 informants from the civil servants, regional secretary, vice regent, member of Baperjakat, politician, regent team during election, regent family, journalist, academician and related parties who understand this study.

The interviews are mainly directed to the key informants and the further information obtained from other informants selection through a snowball technique (Muda *et al.*, 2018). The key informants in this study are regional secretary, vice regent, head and member of Baperjakat and civil servants who got the promotion, mutation and demotion. Other key informants are team who support the regent during the election and other politician. The third is the observation to give new dimensions to understand the context of the observed phenomenon such as photographs or when the interactions occurred between the political elites with bureaucracy official.

## 4. Results and discussions

### 4.1. Results

The relations between politics and bureaucracy in the government of Mandailing Natal Regency after the elections in 2011 was marked by political intervention by the head of the region, especially from the head of the regional family behind him. In the case of Mandailing Natal, the power of the regent's family is a superpower capable of defeating and limiting other political forces such as the DPRD (Local House of Representatives) and political parties. Political intervention against bureaucracy is difficult to avoid, this is caused by several factors namely, First, the still strong political primordialism, where the bonds of kinship, politics of reciprocity, the desire to build a family-based government, seeking security and opportunistic behavior of bureaucrats. Second, the check and balance mechanism has not become a culture and has not been well implemented (Maksum *et al.*, 2014; Muda *et al.*, 2014; Lubis *et al.*, 2016; Muda *et al.*, 2017) Third, the power possessed by politicians tends to corrupt. Fourth, low political party maturity and high dependence on bureaucracy. Fifth, the welfare condition of the bureaucratic apparatus in the regions is still low, which tends to give rise to the practice of rent-seeking through hidden political activities in order to obtain additional income. Sixth, unclear and easily politicized set of rules, such as the lack of employee guidance instruments, the code of ethics has not yet been institutionalized, the status of regional heads as staff builders, and the dual positions of regional heads with the chairman of political parties (Heldan, 2011).

The causal factors that mentioned above are still very strong in the region, including in Mandailing Natal, especially building a kinship-based government. This creates uncomfortable behavior of bureaucratic officials in carrying out their work. Post-election, the people who are considered loyal would be preserved, but the people in the opposite camp would have been swept clean. As for people who are still said to be neutral are forced to give material to survive in his position. This situation ultimately gave birth to an unfavorable working climate.

The inconvenience of structural officials in the bureaucracy in working at the Mandailing Natal District Administration post elections in 2011 and also shown in various regions is generally caused by weak bureaucratic protection to anticipate political intervention. There are some conditions that become the entry point is not conducive to the structural officials of the region. First, the position of the regional head as the personification of the local government makes the civil servants subject to any decision of the regional head. The strong position of the regional head becomes a very powerful weapon to force structural officials in the bureaucracy to participate in the regional heads of political play. Second, the status of civil servants is bound by the contract of work in which it is stated clearly to be ready to be placed anywhere. This contract of work is a compelling reason so that the regional head can rotate the officials. Third, there is no clear formulation and instrument to measure the level of objectivity and political intervention in the policy of the regional head in the field of personnel.

The situation described above is further reinforced by Mosher's view of the recruiting model of bureaucratic officials. Mosher explained that there is a system of personnel appointment based on the political aspect or called the political appointment system. In this system, a political official such as a regional head has the authority to make an appointment policy outside the civil service system. This model is very suitable when associated with what happened in the government of Mandailing Natal District which ultimately led to the inconvenience of bureaucratic work. Civil servants who are not comfortable in working the bureaucratic function will not be optimal.

Politicization of bureaucracy that occurred in Mandailing Natal district in terms of appointment of structural positions allegedly motivated by several factors, as follows: First, The desire to strengthen the Political Power. The most dominant interest in the politicization of bureaucracy in the Mandailing Natal Regency Government is the interest of power. The essence of a regional head should take care of his power. In politics, it is a natural thing. When the head of the region puts

a person in a position, it is not for the benefit of the person placed but for the sake of the person who puts it. The government's staffs are seen from how he performs the functions, authorities, and responsibilities of the authorities. People need not worry as long as the government provides good service, but how will it provide good service if its government also departs from bad things. The hope is that despite the interests of power, although he prepares, organizes his staff, but do not forget that the interests of that power should not go beyond the interests of the government. Because in this context it is running the government instead of exercising power.

Normatively based on Article 17 paragraph (2) of Law Number 43 Year 1999 regarding the Amendment of Law Number 8 Year 1974 regarding the Principles of Personnel, it is affirmed that the appointment of Civil Servants in a position shall be based on the principle of professionalism in accordance with the competence, and the rank of rank assigned to the office and other objective conditions without distinction of sex, race, religion, race or class. However, the condition that occurred in Mandailing Natal Regency did not run according to the regulation.

Besides that, the performance appraisal system of civil servants that is currently valid is the List of Job Implementation Assessment (DP3) sourced from the Circular Letter of Head of Personnel Administration Agency No 02 / SE / 1980 dated February 11, 1980. The purpose of the assessment is to obtain data - objective data in the development of civil servants based on career systems, and work performance systems. Elements assessed in the DP3 format are: loyalty, work performance, responsibility, obedience, honesty, cooperation, initiative and leadership. However, performance assessment of civil servants based on the criteria contained in the DP3 format is only a formality, because the judge of the performance of the civil servants is their superior namely the head of the region.

Such conditions have encouraged the civil servants to work instantly, lazily, tend to seek attention from superiors, and prioritize service to superiors rather than to the community. The civil servants lack the spirit to create innovation, creations and breakthroughs or discoveries in their respective working environments. Discipline, integrity, loyalty, capability and competence in work is not done so that lead to low productivity and performance goals that have been predetermined.

The appointment of bureaucratic structural officials in Mandailing Natal Regency tended to follow the wishes of the regional head. What he wants then should be obeyed. The whole range of bureaucracy is under his control, all must obey the Regent as the Regional Head. This is what creates fear among the bureaucracy, every civil servant becomes worried that causes unrest in the work, for fear if he will be in a mutation if it does not obey the orders of superiors. This is of course done to secure his position, strengthen his power so that no one dared to oppose it. Thus he can run the wheels of government in accordance with his wishes.

Second, strengthen the Kinship Network and form a political dynasty. The principles of personal closeness in the placement of officials in government still dominate in bureaucracy, as well as in Mandailing Natal District. The current bureaucracy has not been separated from family and kinship factors. Of course, the Regent is more concerned with people who have kinship ties or kinship with him to be placed into the bureaucracy. People who are considered meritorious and supportive of him at the time of the general election, which is considered appropriate to be his staff. Thus he has put people in a frame of thought to live by the rules he has set. Including those who take the risk of maintaining their neutrality as civil servants, it raises concerns for the Regent himself, for fear that it will backfire for himself, as it is considered to include enemies into his bureaucracy.

The Regent used a five-year tenure to fill his bureaucracy with his closest friends, family, and relatives. As long as the chosen people qualify and criteria and experience to become an official, then it is not a problem. But if it does not meet the requirements then, of course, its performance in the bureaucracy is still questionable. It indirectly affects the services provided to the community. The use of administrative authorities by state political officials (presidents and ministers at the central level, Governors, and Regents for local government) should pay attention to the values of equality, fairness and openness. The use of this administrative authority must be completely transparent and does not create the impression of abuse of power and authority. The criteria for the appointment of the bureaucracy are based entirely on aspects of employee performance and performance, not on ethnic, kinship, close relationship with political officials, family, home areas, or political affiliations.

In addition, Indonesia's democracy today is still characterized by neo-feudalism because this phenomenon occurs evenly in almost all regions. Neo-feudalism created a family regime, a kind of small monarchy in the region. Under these circumstances, the head of the county bequeathed power or found work for his wife, children, siblings, and other relatives referred to as political dynasties. Under the circumstances, the control of the heads of the regional heads of the region remains up for a long time, although in reality, it does not happen because the regent must be in prison by the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) for corruption cases in 2013.

Third, collect the money for a position. From the results of the research, it was found that the Regent through his trusted person was a Head of Service, he instructed the work unit to deposit some money if they wanted to secure their position, with the threat if they did not follow the instructions then the position would be replaced with other officials. This really undermines the bureaucratic order in Mandailing Natal District. It is imperative to put a bureaucrat in certain positions to see the capabilities and achievements he has, but not so with the reality of the Mandailing Natal Regional Government. Who has the money then he is the one who can occupy certain positions. The bigger the money is, the higher the position can be occupied. The money politics transactions have been so powerful in the bureaucracy, it certainly causes the destruction of the bureaucratic order in Mandailing Natal. Political transactions that occur at the regional level and show logic and common sense stalemate to allow themselves to be involved in things like this that can make the process of democratization in Indonesia hampered and lead to social suicide. The process of buying and selling positions that occurred in Mandailing Natal not only hurt the process of democratization but also increasingly encourage the process of duping among people about the political process.

If we look at what is happening in the Mandailing Natal District Government describes the similarity of the substance of the relationship pattern of political position and bureaucratic office in most other regions in Indonesia, and also in most developing countries that are in a phase of democratic transition. This is reinforced in the characteristics of the political and bureaucratic relations of the Mandailing Natal Government as the power of one or several people who are very master of government and bureaucracy by ignoring all the existing regulations in structural filling in the bureaucracy and seeming very pragmatic in pursuit of personal gain. The discomfort of the bureaucrats is also increasingly at stake because it is in the political arena of politicians and regional heads. Euphoria democracy, especially democracy at the local level gave birth to a new phenomenon in which politicians actually out of the essence of democracy itself by utilizing the momentum of elections for personal and group interests. The powerlessness of bureaucracy in the face of intervention from political forces makes structural positions a platform for power and capital.

Table 1. List of names of civil servants who received promotion, mutation and demotion post Regional Head Election in Mandailing Natal 2011

No	Name/Employment Number	Position/Level/Rank		Information
		Old	New	
1.	M.Daud Batubara, S.Sos,MSi 196809091990091001	Regional Secretary Staff /(II.a)/Junior Supervisor	Regional Secretary/(IV/b)/ First Class Administrator	Promotion/Regen t's Cousin
2.	Abu Hanifah, SH 196102201986031002	Regional Secretary Staff/(II.b)/ Fisrt Class Junior Supervisor	Head of Development Planning Agency/(IV/c)/ Junior Administrator	Promotion
3.	H. Samad, SE, MM 195912311988011012	Regional Secretary Staff/(II.b)/ First Class Junior Supervisor	Regional Secretary Assistant/(IV.c)/ Junior Administrator	Promotion
4.	Drs. H. Ahmad Sayuti, Ak 195708081986021002	Regional Secretary Assistant/(IV/c)/ Junior Administrator	Staff at Development & Finance Expert Staff in Regional Secretary	Demotion
5.	H. Mohd Aswan Hsb, SH 195611021985021001	Head of Population Departemen/(IV/c)/ Junior Administrator	Staff at Government dan Law Expert Staff	Demotion
6.	Drs. A .Ansari Nasution 195711111985031008	Head of Industry, Trade, SMEs and Markets Department/(IV/b)/ First Class Administrator	Staff at Society and Human Resources Expert Staff	Demotion
7.	Kobol Siregar, SP 1961101031981031003	Staff at Regional Secretary/(II/b) First Class Junior Supervisor	Head of Maritime and Fisheries Department/(IV/a)Administrator	Promotion

Based on the research findings described in the above table, it can be interpreted that the intervention conducted by the head of the region is not to build a better bureaucracy, but what happens is bureaucratic chaos because the people who are recruited are not based on the merit system and do not create the principles of human rights in the right place. People who are not qualified in terms of quality occupy a certain position that is not their capacity but for the interest of power. Another thing that is also featured in this intervention is that the behavior of the Regent often violates the system of

administration or labor regulations that have been applied, it is unfortunate that bureaucratic advisory officials have even committed many violations of the regulation.

#### 4.2. Discussions

Such a situation has actually been described by Frederickson (2003) which shows the inclusion of the role of political officials in managing the government bureaucracy is indeed necessary but if what happens strengthening the politics in the relationship actually worsen the image of bureaucracy. Political officials in this case the regional head as a bureaucratic advisor officials in the region actually uses the bureaucracy as a tool to realize the political interests of his class. Of course this condition puts bureaucracy in a position under political control (subordination).

The above research findings phenomenon becomes a challenge for the implementation of good governance of local government that has been declared in this reform era. Reform in the field of government demands the realization of good governance in all areas of government services that are the desire of many parties. Therefore, the term like fit and proper test for a structural position in government to improve the performance and performance of civil servants is very important.

Bureaucracy reform should lead to holistic and comprehensive system change, including changes in mental attitudes and mindset of the bureaucrats and regional heads commitments. The loyalty of civil servants has long been planted in double, one side must be loyal in running public services, but on the other hand, must also serve the interests of power from the head of the region. The implication is that the performance of employees in a government bureaucratic institution becomes less appreciated and neglected because the civil servants are more likely to establish informal communication with political power circles and covertly open networks with holders of power in the community. The relationship between politics and bureaucracy cannot be eliminated, but the challenge is not how to strictly separate the two, but how to create a balanced pattern of relationships between politics and bureaucracy. The balance of relationships should be based on the clarity and balance of roles and responsibilities of each institution namely politics and bureaucracy.

Reflecting on the phenomenon occurring in Mandailing Natal Regency Post-Election in 2011 it is clear that what happens is a very strong intervention from the political power to the bureaucracy in the process of recruitment of structural positions. In other words, bureaucracy becomes subordinate to political power. This phenomenon is reinforced by Carino as Executive Ascendancy where the position of political officer ie head of the region is higher and more dominant from career position in bureaucracy. Standardization of existing procedures cannot be enforced because the willingness of the regional head is so strong and not able to be resisted by career officials, it can also be seen from the helplessness Baperjakat in carrying out its role. The intervention of the political official occurred easily because under current employment law placed the regional head as a staffing officer at the local level. Although in other legislation rules governed the appointment of civil servants in bureaucratic positions, but the authority to make the appointment is full to the head of the region. Similarly, Baperjakat is an institution that has the authority to organize and nominate the names of bureaucratic officials who will be promoted to higher positions, but members of Baperjakat itself is a bureaucratic official whose career and placement in the position is also determined by the head of the region making it difficult for Baperjakat members to act neutral and carry out neutral assessment and submitting proposal from intervention and the interests of political officials. Experts such as Carino (1994) have offered a solution to the political and bureaucratic relationships placed in the bureaucratic subblation pattern, a type that refers to a relatively parallel and balanced pattern of relations between politicians and the bureaucracy. This pattern was born with the background of the notion that bureaucracy is not just an entity that becomes an instrument or tool to implement public policy. Professionally trained bureaucracies possess certain human resources and powers from their position as government officials, and that is gained through a long career path compared to speculative elected politicians in the election.

Another option that can also be considered in order to strengthen the bureaucratic position so as to put its position in balance with political power is to use the New Public Service paradigm in the system in the bureaucratic model. The journey of democratization that took place in Indonesia provided a valuable lesson for the government (bureaucracy) and citizens. Bureaucratic faces and figures are now undergoing a shift from rigidly oriented bureaucracies toward the more democratic, responsive, transparent, non-partisan bureaucracy. The bureaucracy can no longer position itself as an arrogant and untouchable institution by criticism from outside bureaucracy. The wave of political reforms that occurred in 1998 has been able to undermine the wall of bureaucratic arrogance and give birth to a strong civil society. The public demand for improvements in bureaucratic performance has become a public discourse in the current reform era. In addition, the increasingly widespread issue of democratization has strengthened the position of civil society to demand their rights when dealing with bureaucracy. In that context, the bureaucracy needs to revitalize itself to produce democratic, efficient, responsive, and transparent public services.



In the new public service model, public services are based on democratic theory that teaches egalitarian and equality of rights among citizens, since it is essentially the people (*demos*) who are the supreme power holders (*cratein*), have a logical consequence on the concept that since its status in the natural world, even to their status as citizens, they have rights which, by their very nature, are impossible to be taken over, denied and / or violated by anyone in power. In fact, it is the rulers who should be viewed as officials who gain their legitimate power because of the mandate of the citizens through a public contract, a noble agreement of the nation in which all of its contractual substance will be realized in the form of a constitution. In this model, the public interest is formulated as a result of dialogue from the various values that exist within society. The public interest is not formulated by the political elite as stated in the rules. The bureaucracy that provides public services should be accountable to society as a whole. The role of the government is to negotiate and explore the interests of the citizens and various community groups that exist. In this model, public bureaucracy is not merely accountable to the rule of law, but must also be accountable to the values that exist in society, prevailing political norms, professional standards, and citizens' interests. That is a series of ideal public service concepts today in the era of democracy.

The process of recruitment of structural positions in the bureaucracy is also expected to be the highlight of this New Public Service paradigm, where the process is no longer a 'Black Box' that is not penetrated and known by the public, so there must be openness and people are given the opportunity to supervise the process of recruitment of structural positions. So also with the role of other civil society actors that is, academics and the press are also given the opportunity to supervise the recruitment process.

Another possible step is to strengthen the enforcement of the rules by giving clear and decisive sanctions and consistent in the process of recruitment of structural positions considering the weakness of sanctions and even no rules governing the problem. A widespread phenomenon should be reduced by the enforcement of the law strictly for the head of the local or ruler at the local level which is arbitrary in putting a person in a structural position. With the existence of strict legal sanctions is expected to be a lesson and provide a deterrent effect for those who do.

Furthermore, what should also be prepared is the performance indicator and fit and proper test content to the bureaucratic career officer, where the team proposed to do this is an independent team of civil society, academics and the press. This independent team is a team capable of acting neutrally and able to block out frequent political interventions during the recruitment process as well as ensuring transparency and becoming information widely consumed by the public. What needs to be added is to look at the experiences of other countries, it is necessary an institution that can serve as a referee who oversees the implementation of duties and functions of political officials and career officials such as the Civil Service Commission in USA and Australia. This institution is expected to be the supervisor and monitor of the recruitment process by taking into account all the terms and conditions that exist, as well as to provide strict sanctions for those who violate these terms and conditions. It is also expected to be established at the provincial level that can monitor the scope of the province and the regencies below it. (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Recruitment Model of Bureaucracy Structural Officials

#### 4. Conclusions

The process of recruitment of structural positions Bureaucracy in the government of Mandailing Natal Regency is marked by a very dominant political intervention conducted by the Regional Head who won the popular vote through direct election. This phenomenon is common in many parts of Indonesia after the political decentralization is enacted. In the process of recruitment of structural officials in no way runs the system merit mechanism. Regional heads in appointing structural officials only prioritize like and dislike factors regardless of the quality and capacity of the people they choose. The Position and Rank Consideration Board (Baperjakat) as an organization that is expected to strengthen the concept of system merit as a basis for recruiting or promoting elite bureaucracy in local government system in the era of autonomy is also unable to perform the duty properly. Baperjakat is more formalities because whoever name is brewed in Baperjakat already in engineering in such a way in accordance with the wishes of the head of the region (Regent). If the system of recruitment of bureaucratic elites with system merit mechanism, it is expected that the bureaucratic elite will be more professional and capable of carrying out the tasks of governance, development and society in quality and high acceptability to carry out their duties.

In addition, the process of recruitment of structural positions that prioritize like and dislike factors violate personnel regulations, among the violated regulations are Government Regulation No. 41 of 2007 on the Organization of Regional Devices, Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 57 of 2007 on the Technical Guidelines for Organizational Structuring of Regional Devices, and Regulation of the Minister of Home Affairs Number 5 Year 2005 concerning Guidelines for the Assessment of Prospective Secretaries of Provinces and Regencies/City as well as Echelon II Structural Officials in Regencies/City.

In order to strengthen the bureaucratic position so as to put its position in balance with political power is to use the New Public Service paradigm in the system in the bureaucratic model. In the new public service model, public services are based on democratic theory that teaches egalitarian and equality of rights among citizens. The process of recruitment of structural positions in the bureaucracy is also expected to be the highlight of this New Public Service paradigm, where the process is no longer a 'Black Box' that is not penetrated and known by the public, so there must be openness and people are given the opportunity to supervise the process of recruitment of structural positions. So also with the role of other civil society actors that is, academics and the press are also given the opportunity to supervise the recruitment process.

Another possible step is to strengthen the enforcement of the rules by giving clear and decisive sanctions and consistent in the process of recruitment of structural positions considering the weakness of sanctions and even no rules governing the problem. A widespread phenomenon should be reduced by the enforcement of the law strictly for the head of the local or ruler at the local level which is arbitrary in putting a person in a structural position. Furthermore, what should also be prepared is the performance indicator and fit and proper test content to the bureaucratic career officer, where the team proposed to do this is an independent team of civil society, academics and the press. This independent team is a team capable of acting neutrally and able to block out frequent political interventions during the recruitment process as well as ensuring transparency and becoming information widely consumed by the public. What needs to be added is to look at the experiences of other countries, it is necessary an institution that can serve as a referee who oversees the implementation of duties and functions of political officials and career officials such as the Civil Service Commission in USA and Australia. This institution is expected to be the supervisor and monitor of the recruitment process by taking into account all the terms and conditions that exist, as well as to provide strict sanctions for those who violate these terms and conditions. It is also expected to be established at the provincial level that can monitor the scope of the province and the regencies/city below it.

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