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The WTO and Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges for Brazil

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1. Introduction

The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations "commemorated" their twelfth anniversary in November 2013. Policymakers in industrialized nations seem to be both distracted (by the effects of the financial crisis) and more intrigued by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and plurilaterals (e.g., the Trade in Services Agreement, TISA) than by the multilateral approach. The large emerging economies continue to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, ready to fight for their agenda, but unwilling (or unable) to exert positive leadership in advancing the DDA. The private sector, in turn, seems increasingly frustrated with the multilateral trade system. There is a generalized perception that the WTO's disciplines and modus operandi are outdated and cannot keep pace with globalization. In such an environment, it is not surprising that some observers are willing to pose the question: Is the WTO worth "saving"?

This is, of course, the wrong question. It associates the WTO with its most visible activity: the ongoing round of multilateral trade negotiations (the DDA). But the DDA is just the tip of the "iceberg" that encompasses all WTO functions. Even if the DDA were to fail, the WTO would continue to play an important role with respect to transparency in trade practices, monitoring and enforcement of existing multilateral rules and agreements, and dispute settlement procedures. Indeed, a fact often forgotten in the debate is that even amid the difficulties of the DDA, the WTO has made a major contribution to the world economy by disciplining trade protectionism and helping to avoid the possible metamorphosis of the Great Recession into a Great Depression, like the one in the 1930s. Moreover, the multilateral setting provides the best hope for the implementation of disciplines for agricultural trade, the subject of this paper.

The 9th WTO Ministerial Conference concluded in Bali on December 7, 2013, and its results were a cause of great relief for those members and stakeholders that still believe in the multilateral trade system. The Bali Package, put together under the leadership of the new WTO Director General, Roberto Azevêdo, is the first significant sign of movement in the long and, so far, unhappy story of the DDA.[1] The negotiations at the Ministerial, however, underscored not only the potential of the WTO to make a difference but also the difficulty of obtaining results in a multilateral setting.

As I have discussed elsewhere, WTO members and the new Director General face an uphill struggle to revitalize the organization.[2] The need to dispel the impression that the DDA "coma" was terminal was in everybody's minds in Bali. Against this background, the Bali Package is an important step in the right direction. Its main pillars (the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, the decisions on agriculture, and the decisions focusing on least-developed countries [LDCs]) are the first concrete results after twelve years of negotiations. In short, Bali will probably be remembered more as an important moment for the system (showing that the multilateral trade system can still deliver results) rather than as a trade package that will immediately impact major economic trends.

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[1] Not all is doom and gloom at the multilateral level. The selection of the Brazilian WTO Ambassador Roberto Azevêdo as WTO Director General (DG) occurred in a timely and efficient manner in 2013. It may have been a "photo finish," but WTO members should be congratulated for avoiding the confrontations that often accompany these procedures. The outcome is also a testament to the "democratic" approach adopted for the selection. In the Bretton Woods institutions, for example, a candidate who was not the first choice of either the US or the EU – as was the case with the Brazilian candidate for the DG post – would never have been selected. For a description of the WTO selection procedures see Primo Braga (2013a).

[2] See Primo Braga (2013b).

In this paper, I will focus on the role of agricultural negotiations in the context of the DDA. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the history of how agricultural trade was dealt with in the multilateral trade system up to the DDA. Section 3 describes the evolution of agricultural trade negotiations in the current round. Section 4 analyses the results for agriculture at the Bali Ministerial. The paper concludes with a discussion of the opportunities and challenges ahead for concluding agricultural trade negotiations with special reference to Brazilian negotiating interests.

2. Negotiations on Agriculture in the GATT Era[3]

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), negotiated in the post-World War II years, came into force in 1948 and provided the basis for the modern multilateral trade system.[4] Many analysts point out that the GATT makes no fundamental distinction between the treatment of trade in manufactured versus agricultural products. In reality, however, since its origins, the GATT has had special provisions for primary products, carving out exceptions, for example, with respect to the use of quantitative restrictions (banned for manufactured products), export subsidies and export restrictions.

Furthermore, from the very beginning, the behavior of some of the major trading nations contributed to eroding GATT disciplines for agricultural trade. In 1951, for example, the US imposed quotas on dairy imports. Although this case led to the authorization, under GATT dispute procedures, of retaliatory measures in favor of the Netherlands, it indicated that the existing flexibilities would not be enough to constrain governments to resist pressures from agricultural lobbies that could lead to trade-distorting farm policies. In 1954, the US explicitly asked for a waiver from GATT disciplines with respect to agricultural trade.

The erosion of these disciplines was further promoted by the prevalence of many violations by European countries that maintained agricultural protectionist measures, under cover of Article XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments). With the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s, the thrust of agricultural trade policy in Europe became clear: common pricing (through regulation) and Community preferences (via the imposition of variable levies) in contrast with the market-oriented GATT disciplines. As Hudec (1975, p. 201) pointed out, the European Economic Community (EEC, the predecessor of the European Community, one of the basic pillars of the European Union, EU) claimed “the right to complete autonomy over agricultural trade policy.”

Developing countries were significantly affected by trade restrictions on agricultural products imposed by industrialized countries, a fact that was recognized by the Haberler Report (GATT, 1958). The report was particularly critical of the use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and significant tariff escalation in these markets. It led to a series of additional studies analyzing the problems faced by developing countries in terms of agricultural exports, but in practice these studies and related consultations had no significant impact on the general character of agricultural policies in industrialized countries.

Agriculture remained a high-profile topic in the context of both the Kennedy (1962–1967) and the Tokyo (1972–1979) rounds of multilateral negotiations. The results, however, were limited, particularly with respect to temperate agricultural products. Conflicts between the US and the European Community marked this period. Although both parties often disrespected

[3] For details see Primo Braga and Vasconcellos (1991), which provides the basis for this section.

[4] For a comprehensive review of the history of the multilateral trade system, see VanGrasstek (2013).

GATT disciplines, they behaved differently in the context of these negotiations. The US, as a net agricultural exporter, usually pushed for greater trade liberalization, although with exceptions in some specific sectors. The EEC, in turn, a net agricultural importer at the time, had a more conservative approach, emphasizing the "uniqueness" of agriculture and the subordination of trade policies to farm policy objectives. The CAP was considered the cornerstone of the European integration efforts and, as a consequence, non-negotiable. Japan, another major trade player, also shared the view of the "uniqueness" of the agricultural sector and couched its strategy in the context of "food security" concerns.[5]

It was not until the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) that a serious effort to restore disciplines for agricultural trade was implemented. To a certain extent, this was only made possible by a "great bargain" between developed and developing countries in which topics such as trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights were brought into the multilateral trade system, in exchange for liberalization of agriculture and of trade in textiles and clothing (as well as further liberalization of manufactured products).

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) established a system of disciplines structured in three main pillars: (i) import protection (market access); (ii) domestic support; and (iii) export competition. The average tariff cuts for agricultural products ranged from 36% for developed countries (over the 1995–2000 period) to 24% for developing countries (to be implemented over 1995–2004). There was also agreement that the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) – a concept that estimates the monetary value of government support to the agricultural sector – would be cut by 20% (1995–2000) and 13% (1995–2004), respectively, in the case of developed and developing countries. Moreover, commitments to cut the value of export subsidies by 36% (developed countries) and 24% (developing countries) were agreed (volume cuts were defined at 21% and 14%, respectively, for developed and developing countries).[6]

The AoA also established the modern architecture for agricultural trade, classifying government policies in three categories: the so-called green box (measures financed by the government that do not provide price support to producers and that cause minimal trade distortion); blue box (direct payments under production-limiting programs); and amber box (encompassing market price supports, as well as output and input subsidies, which were considered in AMS calculations). Additionally, all non-tariff measures restricting agricultural trade were abolished, although members were allowed to convert these barriers into tariff-rate quotas (with lower tariffs applying to imports below the quota on imported goods and higher tariffs to imports above the quantitative limit). The agreement also included several special-and-differential treatment (SDT) clauses designed to provide "policy-space" to developing countries in supporting their farmers (e.g., Art. 6.2 AoA).

The AoA also recognized that these efforts were just the first step in disciplining agricultural trade. Accordingly, the AoA included a provision that WTO members should resume negotiations on agriculture by December 31, 1999. In spite of the failure of the Seattle Ministerial, agricultural negotiations were reinitiated in a limited manner in March 2000 under the special sessions of the WTO Committee on Agriculture as a result of the Uruguay Round

[5] The meaning of "food security" has evolved over the years. Originally, it meant availability of an adequate and stable food supply. Over time, the concept has been expanded to encompass the demand side of the equation as well, moving toward a comprehensive definition that includes availability (domestic supply, stocks, trade), access (as influenced by income, employment and poverty), utilization (influenced by quality of supply, availability of proper infrastructure, etc.) and stability (meaning that the physical and economic dimensions, as well as quality considerations, are properly addressed "at all times.") For further details, see Diaz Bonilla (2013).

[6] See USDA (2001).

built-in agenda. But with the launch of the DDA in November 2001, agriculture returned to center stage in the multilateral trade negotiations.

3. Agriculture in the DDA

The DDA was launched in Doha, Qatar, at the 4th WTO Ministerial. It was the result of a concerted effort among WTO members to demonstrate that the multilateral system could transcend national differences. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 weighed heavily in national capitals and fostered support for a multilateral effort, even though many countries had doubts about the concrete benefits of the Uruguay Round and were still "digesting" its implementation costs.[7] Developing countries, in particular, were keen to stress that the new round should be a development round, even though there was no consensus on what exactly this would mean.[8]

The EU had been the main "demandeur" for a new round in the WTO era. Its emphasis was on the need to extend multilateral disciplines to new themes such as competition, investment, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation – the so-called Singapore issues, which had initially been tabled at the WTO Singapore Ministerial (1996). This strategy reflected the fact that the EU recognized that it would be in a defensive position with respect to agriculture and, as a consequence, it wanted to broaden the Doha mandate to better explore negotiating trade-offs. Other countries, however, were more cautious and the compromise reached was to focus the DDA on the core negotiating topics of the WTO – agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA) and services – with the decision on the inclusion of the Singapore issues being postponed to the next Ministerial in Cancún.

The early momentum achieved in Doha, however, was not maintained. All major deadlines agreed were missed, and it became clear that the goal of completing the round by the end of 2004 would not be fulfilled. The self-imposed deadline of March 31, 2003, to agree on the basics of a deal on agriculture – an issue considered by many as the deal breaker for the round – was also missed. And as the Cancún Ministerial (September 2003) approached, it became clear that the mid-term review envisaged would be replaced by divisive confrontations.

On agriculture, in particular, a new coalition of countries (the G20) was formed in August 2003.[9] This group was a response to the limited ambition on domestic subsidy cuts, expansion of market access, and control (elimination) of export subsidies for agricultural products, which the EU and the US seemed to be reaching agreement via bilateral discussions just before the Ministerial. At Cancún, the G20 and other key players (the US, EU, Japan…) could not reach a compromise. The negotiations on agriculture became even more complex with the debate on cotton, chosen by least-developed countries (LDCs) as the "poster child" of unfairness in agricultural trade. The so-called Cotton 4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), with the support of non-governmental organizations, had initiated a

[7] The failure of the Seattle Ministerial (1999) was also a vivid memory and an incentive to demonstrate that consensus could be reached on new multilateral initiatives. The parallel with Bali – as a response to the weak results of the two previous Geneva Ministerials – is worth noting.

[8] See Primo Braga and Grainger-Jones (2005) for further details.

[9] Not to be confused with the "financial" G20, which is a forum for governments and central bank governors of the 20 major economies. The membership of the WTO-related G20 has evolved over time and it currently includes: Argentina; Bolivia, Plurinational State of; Brazil; Chile; China; Cuba; Ecuador; Egypt; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; Mexico; Nigeria; Pakistan; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; South Africa; Tanzania; Thailand; Uruguay; Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of; and Zimbabwe.

campaign underlining the distortions introduced by subsidies in industrialized countries. This, in turn, further contributed to a divisive debate during the Ministerial and made it impossible to reach consensus on the Singapore issues at that stage.

The failure of the Cancún Ministerial to advance the DDA agenda led to a period of recriminations among all parties involved. By early 2004, however, a new effort was under way to reanimate the negotiations, since there was growing recognition that if negotiating frameworks could not be agreed upon in the near future, the DDA would be in serious trouble. By July 2004, the WTO General Council had made a final push to achieve consensus, and a deal was reached in the early hours of August 1. Frameworks to advance the negotiations on agriculture and NAMA were agreed upon, along with a series of recommendations concerning services and development-related issues (including cotton). Further to this, a decision was made to start concrete negotiations on trade facilitation, while the other three Singapore issues were dropped from the DDA. These agreements became known as the July package and paved the way for additional efforts on the road to the Hong Kong Ministerial (December 2005).

The July package laid the foundations for future reform of global agricultural trade. It called for the elimination of all types of export subsidies, for the substantial reduction of trade-distorting domestic support, and for market access improvements through a combination of tariff-quota expansion and tariff reductions (with deeper cuts in higher tariffs). At the same time, it established that cotton would be dealt with as a priority in the context of the agricultural negotiations.

As usual, the devil was in the details. At the Hong Kong Ministerial, an agreement was reached on the future elimination of export subsidies, but progress stalled on the other two pillars (market access and trade-distorting domestic support) of the agricultural negotiations. Work on the three pillars continued after Hong Kong and, by 2006, a series of reference papers and a new modalities framework for the agricultural negotiations had been produced. The modalities paper would go through several revisions leading to the December 2008 (Rev. 4) version.[10]

In reality, however, the prospect of a swift conclusion of the round had already been killed by the collapse of the July 2008 mini-Ministerial.[11] Agriculture again played a critical role in this process. Disagreements concerning how best to establish a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for agricultural trade became one of the main reasons for the collapse of the negotiations. The mechanics of the SSM were hotly debated, with net importing developing countries arguing that it was a necessary mechanism to defend farmers from a major decline in import prices and/or surges in imports. Exporters, in turn, were concerned that it could be used for protectionist purposes and argued that there was no need for such a special “safety valve,” since most developing countries would not face major reductions of tariff bindings, in view of the expected provisions to be applied to special products critical for their food security. In addition, as discussed in Grant and Meilke (2011), there was no consensus on whether the SSM should be developed as a framework to deal explicitly with eventual market disruptions associated with the DDA liberalization or, more broadly, with any type of market disruption. Doubts about the economic efficiency of the mechanism were also raised by several authors – e.g., Hertel, Martin and Leister (2010) – who pointed out that it could not only increase price volatility but also destabilize domestic prices, thus leading to the unintended consequences of rising prices and negative welfare implications for poor farmers, who are often net buyers of food.

[10] See WTO (2008).

[11] For a detailed discussion of the 2008 mini-Ministerial, see VanGrasstek (2013).

As a consequence of the impasse in 2008, the DDA entered a period of suspended animation. The usual blame game followed and although there were different views on which countries and topics were responsible for the failure, the consensus was that the US and India were the countries furthest apart in their negotiating positions (VanGrasstek, 2013), and the debate on the SSM was a key factor in this context.

The DDA "coma" and the lack of progress at the Geneva 2011 Ministerial led to growing concerns about the systemic implications of the stalled negotiations. By 2013, many WTO Ambassadors were ready to acknowledge that the fear factor was creating incentives for a make-or-break Ministerial in Bali. In preparing for the Ministerial, Roberto Azevêdo, the new WTO Director General, decided to take a courageous stance, arguing that either a Bali package would be agreed upon or it was time to take a serious look at the future of the multilateral trade system and of the DDA in particular. He also argued that Bali should not become a negotiating Ministerial and tried to secure an agreement on the key parameters of the package in Geneva, in advance of the meeting. By November 26, 2013, however, the Director General noted that even though significant negotiations had occurred and the negotiating package was stable, the membership had failed to reach consensus.[12] As a consequence, too many technical issues were still in "brackets," requiring additional negotiations in Bali – not a good omen for the Ministerial.

4. Bali: Food security as a deal breaker

In Bali, the odds of success seemed to drop even lower when, on the second day of the Ministerial, the Indian Minister of Commerce & Industry, Anand Sharma, made a strong statement arguing that food security was non-negotiable. Positioning itself as the leader of the G33 coalition – a group of 46 WTO members[13] that have large populations of smallholder farmers – India argued that unless developing countries were granted more flexibility for their food purchasing programs, there would be no deal.

By adopting a principled position, India set in motion a "game of chicken" that almost doomed the Ministerial. At the core of the debate was the question of how to treat food-related safety nets in developing countries. The G33 wanted food stocks acquired at administered prices (often entailing a subsidy to domestic producers) to be excluded from the aggregate measure of support (AMS) calculations that discipline the level of support allowed. In the case of India, this was a key objective given the potential implications of multilateral disciplines for its own National Food Security Act (2013). In implementing the Act, India may go beyond agreed limits on trade-distorting subsidies. On the other side of the table, many countries expressed concerns that food reserves built under food-security programs could be dumped in international markets, further distorting agricultural trade. Moreover, it was argued that the exception could erode the credibility of the multilateral Agreement on Agriculture.

The hard bargaining that ensued finally led to a compromise, whereby members agreed that they would refrain from using the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism "in relation to support provided for traditional staple food crops in pursuance of public stockholding programmes for food security purposes" – in other words an implicit Peace Clause – while negotiating a permanent solution. This is not "carte blanche" for the implementation of new trade-distorting programs, since the decision applies only to those programs already in

[12] For a description of the evolution of the negotiations pre-Bali, see Azevêdo (2014).

[13] As VanGrasstek (2013, p. 109) notes, "groups with numerical titles tend to indicate the original numbers of their membership rather than the current number."

existence by the date of the decision, and the notification/transparency requirements are strict. Moreover, an implicit deadline remained – contrary to India's goal of achieving a permanent exemption – since the declaration states that the related work program should be concluded no later than the 11th Ministerial Conference (i.e., 2017). It did, however, give space for the government of India to declare a partial "victory" in communicating the outcome to its domestic constituency.

Some additional agreements were reached in Bali in the context of the agricultural negotiations. These included the decision to expand the list of domestic support measures under the green box to encompass land reform and rural livelihood security programs as "general services"; an understanding on the administration of tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) with a view to tightening the disciplines for the use of these import licensing procedures; reaffirmation of the commitment to eliminate export subsidies and export measures with similar effect; and reaffirmation of the commitment to address distortions affecting trade in cotton "ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically" within the agricultural negotiations.[14]

As Desta (2013) pointed out, it is ironic that in order to achieve an agreement on the Bali Package (and its main achievement, the Trade Facilitation Agreement [TFA]), negotiators had to accept a compromise in agriculture that from a trade liberalization point of view is a step backwards, as illustrated by the peace clause with respect to domestic support measures. The only modest liberalizing decision adopted concerns the new TRQ procedures. One could rationalize this outcome as an attempt to promote a more level playing field with respect to the ability of developing members to explore loopholes in the AoA vis-à-vis the flexibilities enjoyed by developed members in the original architecture of the AoA. This, however, does not bode well for substantive and rapid progress in the post-Bali work program concerning agriculture, as discussed in the next section.

In fact, in 2014 India upped the ante by arguing that the focus of the post-Bali negotiations in Geneva on the TFA protocol contrasted with the lack of progress in advancing the food security negotiations in the post-Bali period. This was a subjective evaluation and led many countries to say that India was reneging on the Bali agreements. This time the "game of chicken" did not end well. The outcome was the failure to adopt the TFA protocol – a necessary step for its future ratification by WTO members. As a consequence, the DDA negotiations are again facing a major crisis.[15]

5. The Road Ahead

The shifting coalitions involved in agricultural trade negotiations in the DDA provide a wealth of material for analysts interested in game theory. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review all the details of the positions taken by different actors over the years.[16] In this concluding section, I will focus only on some aspects of the role that Brazil has played in the agricultural negotiations and related coalitions.

In the last few decades, Brazil has become an agricultural superpower, reflecting its comparative advantage in terms of arable land (the fourth largest endowment in the world), favorable weather conditions and access to water, coupled with improvements in the availability of skilled labor and technology. Although agriculture accounts for just 6.5% of

[14] See WTO (2013).

[15] For details, see Primo Braga (2014).

[16] See VanGrasstek (2013) and Michalopoulos (2014) for a review of the participation of developing countries in the negotiations.

Brazil's gross domestic product (GDP), it employs roughly 17% of its labor force (OECD, 2013). Moreover, the agribusiness sector as a whole (including production, processing and distribution) accounts for roughly 25% of the Brazilian economy and 32% of the country's exports.

Since 1990, average agricultural productivity in grains (including production of cotton, rice, beans, soybeans, wheat, corn, peanuts and sorghum) has increased by more than 100%, and there has also been a dramatic expansion of production of sugar cane and ethanol, as well as meat. Brazil nowadays is a leading exporter/producer of not only coffee and sugar but also orange juice, soy complex, broiler chickens, beef, corn and pork. With more than 100 million hectares of additional available arable land (excluding rainforest and other conservation areas), many analysts predict that Brazil will further increase its strong position in global agricultural trade.[17]

It is not surprising, then, that traditionally Brazil has adopted offensive positions in agricultural trade in the multilateral context – in contrast with defensive positions in NAMA and services. Brazil was a member of the Cairns Group during the Uruguay Round (a North-South coalition of self-identified non-subsidizing agricultural producers with offensive negotiating interests) and later played a key role in the formation of the G20, a group composed only of developing countries that was formed in reaction to the proposal on agricultural trade put together by the US and the EU in 2003.

The G20, however, includes countries with divergent negotiating interests in agriculture. As long as it was able to focus on distortions introduced by developed countries in terms of subsidies and market access restrictions, there were enough common interests to keep the coalition operational. The moment, however, that the negotiations began to address policy flexibilities in developing countries – such as the ones that the SSM would generate – the alliance between Brazil (and other Latin American exporters in the G20) and those countries that had defensive interests – in particular, China and India – became unstable.

In Bali, Brazilian negotiators decided to adopt a conciliatory position, given the inflexibility of India and the support of China and Indonesia – two other key members of the G20 – and to emphasize food security issues in the negotiations. It could be argued that the risks to Brazilian agribusiness interests are limited, since the focus of the related programs in these countries are on products such as rice and wheat, commodities in which Brazil does not have major export interests.[18]

A more fundamental issue, however, concerns the space for significant liberalization outcomes in agriculture as a result of the DDA negotiations, a major strategic objective for Brazil. The reality is that this space is shrinking, not only because of the difficulties in agreeing on effective modalities for negotiations but also because agricultural trade and production have been going through structural transformations since the DDA began. The AoA that emerged from the Uruguay Round and the thrust of the initial negotiations under the DDA focused on a policy environment in which import protection and export subsidies from developed countries put downward pressure on the international prices of commodities and created disincentives for farmers in developing countries. As a consequence, the negotiations in the DDA focused on the development of complex modalities that would strengthen disciplines, particularly for developed countries, while adding flexibilities for

[17] For a discussion of the synergies between Brazil and China in this area, see Primo Braga and Lehmann (2014).

[18] See, for example, Rios and Panzini (2014).

developing countries, since these argued that the AoA was unbalanced, in that it provided flexibilities to bypass the rules mainly to developed countries.

The current policy environment for agricultural trade, however, has shifted significantly compared with the one that prevailed in the late 1990s. As the price of commodities increased in the 2000s and food prices reached new peaks – reflecting crop failures, changes in diet in major developing economies, and the impact of biofuel subsidies – policymakers have increasingly had to deal with a global environment characterized by supply constraints.[19] As a consequence, demands for policy space to protect consumers in net food importing countries have increased. This does not bode well for a negotiating process that is still focused on the distortions introduced by industrialized countries in the past.

It is worth noting that support levels in developed countries remain far greater than those in developing countries. But it is also true that several developing countries, such as China, India, Indonesia, Russia and Turkey, have significantly increased their subsidies to farmers since the DDA negotiations began.[20] These developments will further limit opportunities for Brazil to nurture substantive coalitions of pro-trade countries in the context of the agricultural negotiations.

As Boonekamp (2014) argued, an effort to simplify the negotiating framework and to build on the “Bali spirit” to achieve practical results is worth exploring. The reality, however, is that an “early harvest” focusing on agriculture is unlikely to be agreed in the near future. In short, the outcome of the agricultural negotiations will inevitably be linked to bargains involving results in the negotiations on NAMA and services. In this context, time is not on Brazil’s side since its ability to engineer a pro-trade outcome in agriculture will tend to be further eroded by growing food security concerns in key developing nations.

[19] See, for example, Meyer and Schmidhuber (2013).

[20] See Bureau and Jean (2013) and OECD (2013).

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