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## Deep Diving into the S&P 350 Europe Index Network and Its Reaction to COVID-19

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## Deep Diving into the S&P Europe 350 Index Network and Its Reaction to COVID-19

Ariana Paola Cortés Ángel<sup>[1][2]</sup>, Mustafa Hakan Eratalay<sup>[2]</sup>

Abstract: In this paper, we analyse the dynamic partial correlation network of the constituent stocks of S&P Europe 350. We focus on global parameters such as radius, which is rarely used in financial networks literature, and also the diameter and distance parameters. The first two parameters are useful for deducing the force that economic instability should exert to trigger a cascade effect on the network. With these global parameters, we hone the boundaries of the strength that a shock should exert to trigger a cascade effect. In addition, we analysed the homophilic profiles, which is quite new in financial networks literature. We found highly homophilic relationships among companies, considering firms by country and industry. We also calculate the local parameters such as degree, closeness, betweenness, eigenvector, and harmonic centralities to gauge the importance of the companies regarding different aspects, such as the strength of the relationships with their neighbourhood and their location in the network. Finally, we analysed a network substructure by introducing the skeleton concept of a dynamic network. This subnetwork allowed us to study the stability of relations among constituents and detect a significant increase in these stable connections during the Covid-19 pandemic.

**Keywords:** Financial Networks, Centralities, Homophily, Multivariate GARCH, Networks Connectivity, Gaussian graphical model, Covid-19

JEL Clasification: C32, C58, G15.

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## 1 Introduction

The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 encouraged researchers to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to studying the systemic risk in the financial sector to understand and model it. Caccioli, Barucca, and Kobayashi (2018) delve into this topic, developing a survey that focuses mainly on network analysis. The interest in understanding the topology of financial networks was born to realise its possible reaction when impacted by economic shocks and the possible consequences that these shocks entail.

This paper aims to analyse the topology of the network derived from the interrelationships between the stocks that constitute the S&P Europe 350 index, considering adjusted closing prices from January 2016 to September 2020. This index contains 350 blue-chip companies from 16 developed European countries. These companies can be considered as "too big to fail" and are likely to have the most resilient connections that would survive a crisis. We especially want to know which firms are the most central in a dynamic network setup, how the connectedness of the graph evolves under the influence of the pandemic shock, and determine if the network links follow a homophilic behaviour. To capture the effect of the trends in the world economy on these stock prices, we use the Morgan Stanley Capital International World (MSCI World) index as the common factor.

In general, the network analysis on financial networks has primarily focused on the study of over a handful of graph parameters, like diameter, average path length, and various centrality measures (Anufriev and Panchenko, 2015, Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014, and Kuzubaş, Ömercikoğlu, and Saltoğlu, 2014 to mention some). Two main topics studied in a network are connectivity and centrality. To study different vertex characteristics, we study three centralities (degree, closeness, and betweenness). Regarding connectivity, we focus on two types: network connectivity; that is, its number of edges, and local connectivity of a node, meaning its number of adjacent neighbours.

We use the consistent dynamic conditional correlation model (cDCC-GARCH), and the multivariate model presented by Aielli (2013). Following the same theoretical approach as in Eratalay and Vladimirov (2020) and Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), we obtain the partial correlation network by applying the Gaussian Graphical Model algorithm (GGM). Then we obtain global and local measurements of the network to identify which companies are most sensitive to external changes give the system's structure; for this, we will rely on Demirer et al. (2018), and Kuzubaş, Ömercikoğlu, and Saltoğlu (2014) for the betweenness and closeness centralities.

In addition to the diameter and average path length, we calculate the radius of the partial correlation network; with these complementary measures, we can enhance our understanding of the topology of the network given the following: assuming that a shock has a single node

as an entry point from which it will spread throughout the network, the diameter and radius can be interpreted as the minimum force a shock should have to ensure its propagation all over the network in two different scenarios: the diameter, when the entry point is unknown, and the radius, when the entry point can be selected. On the other hand, the average path length shows the average force needed for shock transmission between any pair of vertices.

We perform a homophilic profile, where we measure the tendency of the edges of the network to create bonds with similar nodes; we found a direct relationship between the partial correlations and the proportion of homophilic edges, which helps us get a clearer perspective of the underlying network structure. Homophily is a novel approach since, regardless of being a well-known topic in social sciences, it has been barely mentioned in the financial networks literature, such as Elliott, Hazell, and Georg (2020), and Barigozzi and Brownlees (2019) where it is referred to as similarity. Moreover, based on the daily network pictures, we capture the system's dynamics by introducing the concept of the skeleton of a dynamic network, which may be used as a forecast enhancing tool or interpreted as a shock strength measure. Thanks to the analysis of this new substructure, we found that during the Covid-19 pandemic there was an increase in the number of stable relationships.

To sum up, we studied two kinds of parameters: global (radius, diameter, average distance) and local (degree, closeness, harmonic, betweenness, and eigenvector centralities). Moreover, we developed a homophilic profile by industry and country; we introduce the definition of the skeleton of a dynamic network, which results from collecting the resilient edges over time. This paper focuses on the methodology to obtain and analyse some of the most representative global and local centrality measures of a network, allowing us to map the topology of the network under study. These measures could serve as input in systemic risk studies and could be complemented with more information such as the risk profile of each firm and its balance sheet, among others.

What remains of this work is structured as follows. In Section 2, we make a literature review of Network Analysis and Financial Networks. In Section 3, we describe the data under study. Later, in Section 4, we present the methodology implemented for Financial Econometrics and Network Analysis. In Section 5, we analyse the results, and in Section 6, we conclude.

### 2 Literature Review

By analysing centralities, central banks can identify Global Systemically Important Institutions (G-SIIs), which can help regulate them, as already suggested in several other studies. For instance, the work of Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2014) bases a large part of its analysis on the topology of the interbank network, creating a measure of centrality composed of the closeness, betweenness, and the degree centralities (the latter being called strength).

Kuzubaş, Ömercikoğlu, and Saltoğlu (2014) take as an example the Turkish crisis that occurred in 2000, and in addition to the degree, closeness, and betweenness centralities, they calculate the Bonacich centrality. These two studies describe the interbank network.

Several more articles develop the centralities, focusing mainly on degree and eigenvector, such as Millington and Niranjan (2020) and Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), or Iori and Mantegna (2018), where average distance is added to their analysis, and Billio et al. (2012), who calculate proximity and eigenvector.

## 2.1 Network Analysis

During the 1960s and 1970s, several mathematical and statistical tools started to be used by social scientists to get a better understanding of the structure and behaviour of social networks (Milgram, 1967, Zachary, 1977, Killworth and Bernard, 1978). While the statistical tools are used to obtain quantitative results, the mathematical devices borrowed from graph theory allow us to discover and visualise the underlying structure of the studied data.

In the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, with the seminal works made by Albert, Jeong, and Barabási (1999), Faloutsos, Faloutsos, and Faloutsos (1999), and Watts and Strogatz (1998), among others, the above mention set of tools, combined with the growing availability of information to the general public and the increased computational power to analyse big data sets led to the creation of network theory as a discipline on its own. Since then, this type of research was applied to study a wide variety of topics, such as genomics, epidemics, cybersecurity, communication, financial markets, social interactions, linguistics and more (Lewis, 2011, Keeling and Eames, 2005, Solé et al., 2010).

The primary strength of network analysis lies in the fact that it incorporates a multidisciplinary approach that utilises a range of theories, from social sciences, such as economics to exact sciences, such as biology. A great amount of detail about this can be found in Jackson (2011), who suggests that all that is needed for this approach is to identify agents and the relationships that connect them. For instance, using the labour market to understand searching and matching models, or using social networks to analyse human behaviour.

#### 2.2 Financial Networks

The financial network is one example of a complex system, where there are many actors (financial institutions, where mainly interbank connections have been studied) and an uncountable number of interrelations among them. Caccioli, Barucca, and Kobayashi (2018) delve into systemic risk, utilizing network analysis as their primary tool.

The application of network theory to financial networks has shown that high connectivity can produce one of two effects when a disruption to the system occurs – absorption (Allen

and Gale, 2000, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000) or contagion (Gai and Kapadia, 2010, Elliott, Golub, and Jackson, 2014). If the disruption to the system is minor and within a certain threshold, the connectivity of the network helps to alleviate the shock, which can be interpreted as absorption. However, if the disruption exceeds the threshold, instead of softening the impact, the interconnections augment the spread of it, as shown in Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015).

The relationships in a network can be direct or indirect. One example of a direct network is the interbank market, where the relationship is the trade of currency executed directly by the banks Allen and Babus (2009).

In our case, the relationship is indirect and describes how the behaviour of one company can lead to the behaviour of others in response; as an example, we can imagine that there is a waltz, where the couples are the firms, there are several couples, they may or may not know each other, but they all dance considering the movements of the other couples.

We derive this relationship from the partial correlation matrix. This method has been widely applied and modified; to mention some Eratalay and Vladimirov (2020), Kenett et al. (2010), Anufriev and Panchenko (2015) and Iori and Mantegna (2018) write a compendium of several studies and their different applications, some of them using this same approach, all with the idea of understanding how a network reacts to disruption in greater depth.

Many studies of financial systemic risk based on network theory developed since 2007, consider a worldwide assortment of components, such as in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009), which assesses equity stocks of developed and emerging countries, or Anufriev and Panchenko (2015), considering the Australian market or Diebold and Yilmaz (2015) among US and European contexts.

## 3 Data

We use the constituent stocks of the S&P Europe 350 index, which is made up of 350 blue-chip companies from 16 different developed European countries. This index provides us with a significant sample of the European stock market, which is why we take it as the basis for this study, which mainly focuses on the methodology of the study of financial networks.

The S&P Europe 350 index components, along with their market capitalizations and tickers, were directly provided by Standard and Poors, with figures from December 2019. We use the provided data to gather the daily adjusted closure price history from January 2014 to October 2020 from Yahoo Finance. We also used the returns from the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI World) for which we collected the data for the same dates and from the same source.

From the raw data received, we synchronised the time periods and removed the series for which there were fewer observations. Also, if a company had preferred and common stocks, we removed the preferred stocks from our list to avoid contamination of the results with the evident strong correlation. After these adjustments, we had the price data of 331 firms from S&P Europe 350. We considered the time period from January 2016 to September 2020 for stocks in the S&P Europe 350 and for the MSCI World index, which gave us 1,202 price observations for each series.

For all firms, we calculated their log-returns and after that we treated the data with a generalised Hampel filter. Using a 20-day moving window, on average 0.42% of the data was identified as outliers, which were replaced by the local medians in the corresponding window. [3] Details about this method can be found in Pearson et al. (2015). From this point forward, we use this outlier filtered return data.

The COVID pandemic started to become evident in Europe by the end of February 2020, Plümper and Neumayer (2020), we can observe in Figure 1 a significant increase in the index volatility being a consistent reaction to the pandemic shock. Given that our sample has 331 firms with 1,201 observations each, we use box plots to summarise the descriptive statistics. From Figure 2, we can notice that the returns lie around zero; with a standard deviation of around two. On average, returns are slightly negatively skewed, but for some series the skewnesses are less than minus one, implying that their distributions are highly negatively skewed. The average kurtosis is around nine but with many outliers above 20, suggesting leptokurtic distributions for all series.

<sup>[3]</sup> The maximum percentage of outliers was 1.8%, while the median was 0.41%. The percentage was above 1% for only four firms.




Figure 1: S&P Europe 350 Index Returns from January 2016 to September 2020. By the beginning of March 2020, we can notice a sudden increase in the volatility. *Source:* Authors' calculations.




Figure 2: Descriptive statistics of the S&P Europe 350 index returns from January 2016 to September 2020 Source: Authors' calculations.

## 4 Methodology

The methodology will be divided in two main parts, the econometric approach and the network theory approach.

### 4.1 Econometrical Analysis

The econometric analysis will be based mainly on the work of Eratalay and Vladimirov (2020). Instead of the unobservable factor in their model, we consider the Morgan Stanley Capital International World (MSCI World) index as a common observable factor. <sup>[4]</sup> We include the common observable factor, which otherwise would bring about spurious connections in the network. (See a discussion in Barigozzi and Brownlees, 2019 and Eratalay and Vladimirov, 2020). We chose MSCI World as an indicator of the general trend in the behaviour of developed economies worldwide.

A return series  $r_t$  can be modelled as:

$$r_t = \mathbb{E}_t(r_t \mid I_{t-1}) + \sqrt{\mathbb{V}ar_t(r_t \mid I_{t-1})}\varepsilon_t \tag{1}$$

where  $E_t(r_t|I_{t-1})$  is the conditional mean,  $Var_t(r_t|I_{t-1})$  is the conditional variance, and the  $\varepsilon_t$  is the standardised disturbance such that  $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0,1)$ . The conditional mean and the conditional variance are functions of the information up to t-1, denoted by  $I_{t-1}$ .

#### 4.1.1 Conditional mean

For modelling the return vector, we will use a vector autoregressive model, VAR(1).

$$r_t = \mu + \Phi r_{t-1} + \Theta r_{t-1}^M + \eta_t \tag{2}$$

where  $\mu$  is a  $n \times 1$  column vector representing the intercept;  $\mathbf{\Phi}$  and  $\mathbf{\Theta}$  are  $n \times n$  matrices of parameters of the returns lagged one period from S&P Europe 350 stock returns and the MSCI World index, respectively. In particular  $\mathbf{\Theta}$  is a diagonal matrix. For each series i,  $\eta_{t,i}$  is the error term represented by a random process with mean zero and variance  $h_{t,i}$ , such that  $\eta_{t,i} = \sqrt{h_{t,i}} \varepsilon_{t,i}$ , and  $\varepsilon_{t,i}$  are the standardised errors.

<sup>[4]</sup> Given the cross-sectional size of our data, the model with an unobservable factor would be very parameter intensive and infeasible.

#### 4.1.2 Conditional variance

Let us denote the conditional mean and the conditional variance of series i as  $\mu_{t,i}$  and  $h_{t,i}$ , respectively. Therefore, the error term  $\eta_{t,i}$  can be expressed as:

$$\eta_{t,i} = r_{t,i} - \mu_{t,i} = \sqrt{h_{t,i}} \varepsilon_{t,i}, \text{ where } \eta_{t,i} \sim N(0, h_{t,i})$$
(3)

For each time series i the conditional variance of the error term can be represented as a GARCH(1,1):

$$h_{t+1,i} = \omega_i + \alpha_i (r_{t,i} - \mu_{t,i})^2 + \beta h_{t,i}$$

$$= \omega_i + \alpha_i h_{t,i} \varepsilon_{t,i}^2 + \beta_i h_{t,i}$$

$$= \omega_i + \alpha_i \eta_i^2 + \beta_i h_{t,i}$$
(4)

where the parameters  $\omega_i > 0$ ,  $\alpha_i \geq 0$ ,  $\beta_i \geq 0$  and  $\alpha_i + \beta_i < 1$ , hence each  $h_{t,i}$  process is stationary.

In the matrix representation, we can write that  $r_t \mid I_{t-1} \sim N(\mu_t, \mathbf{H_t})$ , and  $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \mathbf{I_n})$ , with  $\mathbf{H_t} = \mathbb{V}ar(r_t \mid I_{t-1}) = \mathbb{V}ar(\eta_t \mid I_{t-1})$  and  $r_t = \mu_t + \mathbf{H_t}^{1/2}\varepsilon_t$ . Here  $\mathbf{H_t}$  is the conditional variance-covariance matrix and it can be decomposed as as:

$$\mathbf{H}_t = \mathbf{D}_t \mathbf{R}_t \mathbf{D}_t \tag{5}$$

$$\mathbf{D}_t = \operatorname{diag}\{\sqrt{h_{t,i}}\}\tag{6}$$

where  $\mathbf{H}_t$  depends on  $\mathbf{R}_t$ , the conditional correlation matrix, and  $\mathbf{D}_t$ , a diagonal matrix of the standard deviations.

#### 4.1.3 Dynamic conditional correlations

In this section we discuss  $\mathbf{R}_t$ , the matrix of conditional correlations. Each of its elements is in the interval [-1,1] and, according to (5),  $\mathbf{R}_t$  should be positive definite in order for  $\mathbf{H}_t$  to be positive definite as well.

We follow the consistent dynamic conditional correlation (cDCC) model of Aielli (2013):

$$\mathbf{R}_t = \mathbf{Q}_t^{*-1} \mathbf{Q}_t \mathbf{Q}_t^{*-1} \tag{7}$$

$$\mathbf{Q}_{t}^{*-1} = \begin{bmatrix} 1/\sqrt{q_{11t}} & 0 & \dots & 0\\ 0 & 1/\sqrt{q_{22t}} & \dots & 0\\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots\\ 0 & 0 & \dots & 1/\sqrt{q_{nnt}} \end{bmatrix}$$
(8)

$$\mathbf{Q}_{t} = (1 - \theta - \kappa)\bar{\mathbf{Q}} + \theta\{\mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{*}\varepsilon_{t-1}\varepsilon_{t-1}'\mathbf{Q}_{t-1}^{*}\} + \kappa\mathbf{Q}_{t-1}$$
(9)

where using  $\varepsilon_t^* = \mathbf{Q}_t^* \varepsilon_t$  and  $\varepsilon_t^{*'} = \varepsilon_t' \mathbf{Q}_t^*$ , we can simplify the previous equation:

$$\mathbf{Q}_{t} = (1 - \theta - \kappa)\bar{\mathbf{Q}} + \theta\{\varepsilon_{t-1}^{*}\varepsilon_{t-1}^{*'}\} + \kappa\mathbf{Q}_{t-1}$$
(10)

$$\bar{\mathbf{Q}} = \mathbb{C}ov(\varepsilon_t^* \varepsilon_t^{*'}) = \mathbb{E}(\varepsilon_t^* \varepsilon_t^{*'}) \tag{11}$$

Where  $\kappa \geq 0$  and  $\theta \geq 0$  are scalars ensuring  $\kappa + \theta < 1$ , and  $\bar{\mathbf{Q}}$  represents the unconditional covariance of the standardised disturbances, also known as the long-run covariance matrix, and for this work it will be replaced by the sample covariance of the residuals  $\varepsilon_t^*$ . This is called the variance targeting approach. (See Engle, 2002 for details.)

The estimation for the conditional mean, conditional variance and conditional correlation parameters is realised using the three-step estimation following the Eratalay and Vladimirov (2020) path. The resulting quasi-maximum likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal.<sup>[5]</sup>

## 4.2 Network Analysis

Once we have the conditional correlation matrix, we compute the partial correlation matrix using the GGM algorithm. From this partial correlation matrix, we construct our network, where each vertex will represent a firm, and the strength of the correlation between them will be represented by edges.

It should be noted that the range of partial correlations is [-1,1]; that is, there are negative and positive values, leading to data distortion or data loss in some instances (e.g., when adding values). For this reason, we take into account the following cases throughout this work:

• Net data, the original partial correlation values, positive and negative.

<sup>[5]</sup> Discussion and examples of such three step estimation can also be found in Bauwens, Laurent, and Rombouts (2006), Carnero and Eratalay (2014), Almeida, Hotta, and Ruiz (2018).

- Absolute data; that is, the absolute value of original partial correlation.
- Positive data; that is, only positive values within the partial correlation.

In addition, each partial correlation matrix will also be a symmetric arrangement, and it will correspond to the adjacency matrix of its respective network. We will consider an edge in all the cases except when  $a_{ij} = 0$ , which means that there is not a linear interdependence among i and j.

Formally, a graph or network, denoted by G, is an ordered pair of disjoint sets (V(G), E(G)), where V(G) is a non-empty set of vertices or nodes, and E(G) is the set of edges or links, where each edge is an unordered pair of distinct vertices  $\{i, j\}$  simply denoted as  $ij^{[6]}$ . Whenever two nodes i and j form a link ij, it is said that they are adjacent with each other, and that they are neighbors.

The simplest parameters of a network G are its number of vertices, called the *order* of G and denoted by N, and its number of edges, called the *size* of G and denoted by m(G).

The most usual way to visually represent a graph is a diagram where each node is represented by a point or small circle and an edge is represented by a line that connects its end-vertices without crossing over any other vertex. Any unweighted graph of N vertices can be represented by a  $N \times N$  matrix  $\mathbf{A}$ , called its *adjacency matrix*, where the entry  $a_{ij}$  of  $\mathbf{A}$  is equal to 1 if there is an edge between the nodes i and j, or otherwise  $a_{ij} = 0$ .

When modelling some practical problems, we could assign a real number w(ij) to every link ij, representing its  $weight^{[7]}$ . In such a case, graph G together with the collection of weights on its edges is called a  $weighted\ graph$ , and we can add this extra information into the adjacency matrix of G, so instead of 0's and 1's we have that  $a_{ij} = w(ij)$ . This allows us to present in the adjacency matrix not only the existence of a relation between the end vertices of a link, but also take into account some characteristic that allows us to quantitatively differentiate between links, depending on the context.

In fact there is a one-to-one correspondence between symmetric matrices and weighted graphs, which allows us to define a network from any such matrix. In our case, the partial correlation matrices will play the role of the adjacency matrices in our graphs, where its values represent how close the co-movement of two firms are after controlling for the correlations with other firms, and how similar their behaviour over time<sup>[8]</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>[6]</sup>Although edges that go from one vertex to itself (called *loops*) can be defined, they have no useful interpretation within the scope of this study.

<sup>[7]</sup> For instance, such values could represent the cost of communicating or the distance between two locations, or the flow capacity in a transportation network, or the strength of the relationship between the elements etc.

<sup>[8]</sup> Notice that, since the adjacency matrix is symmetrical, we cannot infer any causality within the network. Rather it presents the contemporaneous reactions of stock returns to different financial or economic shocks.

This way, the weight w(ij) of the link ij will be equal to the partial correlation between the two corresponding firms.




Figure 3: Weighted graph G and its adjacency matrix A

In addition, in any network, a path between vertices i and j is a sequence of distinct vertices  $x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_k$ , where  $i = x_0$  and  $j = x_k$ , such that  $x_i$  and  $x_{i+1}$  form an edge in the network. For unweighted graphs the integer k represents the length of such a path; that is, the number of edges contained in the path, while for weighted networks the length of the path is the sum of the weight of its edges. Any shortest path connecting i and j is called a geodesic and its length is called the distance between its end vertices, denoted by d(i,j). In other words, the distance between two vertices is the minimum length that separates one node from the other. If there is no path connecting two nodes, the distance between them is defined as infinite.

Before continuing, we first need to highlight an important aspect of a distance metric. Distance is a value that represents how closely related two objects are in the following way: the lower the value, the closer those objects are<sup>[9]</sup>. In contrast, the higher the partial correlation between two firms, the more related they are. Therefore, it is necessary to reverse the order of the partial correlations so the respective new values can be handled like a proper distance metric (Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz, 2010), where lower values correspond to closeness. For this reason, we will use the inverse of the weight for each link whenever we calculate lengths and distances; in other words, a new weight  $w^*(ij) = [w(ij)]^{-1}$  is assigned to each edge when computing any distance-related measure in the network.

From here, three relevant graph parameters are directly derived. First, the average path length of graph G, denoted by  $\overline{d}(G)$ , is defined as the average distance between every pair

<sup>[9]</sup> To get into the mathematical theory behind metric spaces, please see Willard (2012).

of nodes in the network; that is,

$$\overline{d}(G) = \frac{1}{\binom{N}{2}} \sum_{i \neq j} d(i, j). \tag{12}$$

Second, the radius of G is the minimum length k such that there is a node whose distance to any other node is at most k, and is denoted by rad(G). And, finally the diameter of G, denoted by diam(G), is the maximum distance between any two nodes in the graph. Clearly  $rad(G) \leq diam(G)$  and  $\overline{d}(G) \leq diam(G)^{[10]}$  hold.

The radius and diameter tell us the minimum and maximum distance respectively that we expect to cover from one random node to reach all the other nodes. In other words, they help us set boundaries that measure the distance a shock should transit to propagate over the entire network despite its starting point.

It is worth mentioning that there are some graphs on which a proper distance can not be defined. When defining a distance on a network we are implicitly looking at an optimization problem where we want to find the shortest or cheapest way to move between any pair of nodes. We are guaranteed to find a solution to this problem and define a distance provided that all weights assigned to the edges are positive.

Unfortunately, when dealing with negative weights, this task cannot be fulfilled whenever there is a negative cycle, which is a sequence of distinct vertices  $C = x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_k$  such that every pair of consecutive nodes form an edge and  $x_1x_k$  is also an edge, and w(C) < 0. In such a case, the minimization problem has no solution since any path connected to this negative cycle can become cheaper and cheaper by walking inside the negative cycle and looping indefinitely. On the bright side, despite the fact that some algorithms (like Dijkstra's) are not designed to handle negative weights and fall into an infinite loop, there are some that can determine if there is any negative cycle, namely Bellman-Ford's algorithm (Wu and Chao, 2004).

#### 4.3 Centralities

Centrality measures are tools that allow us to quantify the importance or influence that a vertex has over the network as a whole or in a locally delimited region.

For unweighted graphs, the degree centrality of vertex i, denoted by  $C_D(i)$ , is the number of neighbours that such a node has, while for weighted graphs the degree centrality of i is the sum of the weights of all the edges incident to  $i^{[11]}$ :

<sup>[10]</sup> The radius and average path length cannot be related to an inequality, since there are graphs whose radius is greater than, or less than, or equal to the average path length. See Figure 8.

<sup>[11]</sup> Graph theorists refer to the degree centrality in unweighted graphs simply as *degree*, and in weighted graphs as the *weight* of the vertex.

$$C_D(i) = \sum_{j} w(ij). \tag{13}$$

This measure evaluates how strong the local connectivity or influence of each node individually is.

The *Closeness centrality* of a node is defined as the inverse of the sum of its distances to all other nodes in the network; that is:

$$C_C(i) = \left[\sum_{j \neq i} d(i, j)\right]^{-1} = \frac{1}{\sum_{j \neq i} d(i, j)}.$$
 (14)

Since this value is at most equal to  $\frac{1}{N-1}$ , then the normalised closeness centrality of the node i is

$$C_C^*(i) = (N-1)C_C(i). (15)$$

On the same note, the harmonic centrality of a vertex is defined as

$$C_H(i) = \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{d(i,j)},\tag{16}$$

where 1/d(i, j) = 0 if the distance between i and j is infinite. The normalized harmonic centrality of a node is

$$C_H^*(i) = \frac{1}{N-1}C_H(i). \tag{17}$$

Both closeness and harmonic centralities measure how close a node is to all remaining nodes and have quite similar behaviour. The main difference between them is that closeness centrality is not defined for disconnected graphs while harmonic centrality is. Both normalised versions lie in the real interval [0, 1], where the closer these values are to 1, the closer the respective vertex is to the others.

Alternatively, the betweenness centrality of a node is defined as

$$C_B(i) = \sum_{s \neq i \neq t} \frac{\sigma_{st}(i)}{\sigma_{st}},\tag{18}$$

where  $\sigma_{st}$  denotes the number of distinct geodesics from s to t, and  $\sigma_{st}(i)$  is the number of

those geodesics that contain node i. The normalized betweenness centrality of a node is

$$C_B^*(i) = \frac{2}{(N-1)(N-2)} C_B(i). \tag{19}$$

In this case, we measure the importance of node i given its location within the topology of the network. In a sense, we are quantifying how essential i is to the connectivity of any pair of the remaining nodes i.e. if i acts (or not) as a bridge that connects the other members of the graph.

Given the adjacency matrix of the network,  $\mathbf{A}$ , and its largest eigenvalue,  $\lambda$ , the eigenvector centrality of vertex i, denoted as  $C_E(i)$ , is the i-th entry of the eigenvector  $\mathbf{x}$ , which is the unique solution to equation

$$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \lambda\mathbf{x}$$

such that x has only positive entries and  $xx^{\top} = 1$ . Hence  $C_E(i) = x_i$ , where  $\mathbf{x}^{\top} = (x_1 \ x_2 \ \cdots \ x_N)$ . According to eigenvector centrality, a node is important in the network if its neighbours are important.

## 4.4 Homophily

When analysing a network, one can wonder if certain attributes of the vertices, or their combination, play a role in the existence of edges or the lack thereof within the network. For instance, in social networks, friendships generally tend to be established between people with similar characteristics (gender, age, beliefs, spoken language, etc). By contrast, couples are prone to form between persons of the opposite gender on a dance floor. We can detect such behaviour by measuring what is called *homophily*: to assess if there is a bias (in favour or against) on the number of links between nodes with similar characteristics.

To measure any network's bias in the distribution of edges towards one or more regions, we have to compare the relative number of edges inside such regions against the whole graph. Given the network G, and  $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_k$  disjoint subsets of vertices with size  $n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_k$  respectively, we first compute the maximum possible number of edges such that both of its ends are in the same subset  $X_i$ , which is  $\binom{n_i}{2}$  for each i. Then, we sum all of these values and divide the result by the maximum number of edges of the whole network; that is,  $\binom{N}{2}$ , this quotient is called the *baseline homophily ratio* of the network G and is denoted by  $hr^*(G)$ , in other words:

<sup>[11]</sup> The existence of such a solution is guaranteed by the Perron–Frobenius Theorem, see Horn and Johnson (2012)

$$hr^*(G) = {N \choose 2}^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^k {n_i \choose 2} = \sum_{i=1}^k \frac{n_i(n_i - 1)}{N(N - 1)}.$$
 (20)

Later, we compute the *homophily ratio* of network G, denoted by hr(G), which is the quotient of the total number of edges in the network whose ends are both in the same subset  $X_i$  to the total number of edges in the network; that is:

$$hr(G) = \sum_{i=1}^{k} \frac{m_i}{m(G)},$$
 (21)

where  $m_i$  is the number of links with both ends in  $X_i$ .

When a network is constructed in such a way that each link has the same probability of forming despite the attributes of its end vertices, it is fair to expect that both ratios would be pretty close <sup>[12]</sup>. So, whenever the homophily ratio is significantly greater than its baseline, then G is called *homophilic*, and when it is significantly lower it is said that G is  $heterophilic^{[13]}$ . For example, in Figure 4 we can see two networks with opposite homophilic behaviour. In both cases, the subsets of vertices considered are the same and coloured red, blue, and green, respectively, so the baseline homophily is equal to 2/7 = 0.29 for the two networks. On the other hand, the homophily ratios are 5/7 = 0.71 and 3/19 = 0.16 for the left and right networks, respectively. In other words, for the network on the left side, the nodes tend to create links within the groups, while in the network on the right side, this tendency occurs between nodes of different groups.

<sup>[12]</sup> Clearly both will differ, so a statistical significance test is often used to quantify how significant their difference is. In our case, we will not use such a test since we will focus on how the difference of the homophily ratios is related to the strength of the relations of the network by considering a sequence of increasing cut-offs to the weight of the edges.

<sup>[13]</sup> Sometimes referred as inversed homophily (Easley and Kleinberg (2010)).




Figure 4: Examples of homophilic and heterophilic networks. In both cases three subsets of vertices are considered and marked with different colors.

#### 4.5 Network Skeleton

To better understand and analyse a complex system, we often use different networks to represent the state of the system at different points in time, so at the end, we have a collection of networks that enable us to study the evolution of the system over time. Taking that into account, we define dynamic network as an ordered sequence of networks defined over the same set of vertices<sup>[14]</sup>. When working with weighted networks, we can interpret the weight of each link in a given moment as the strength of the relationship it represents at that particular point in time, and no matter how strong, some of these relations tend to appear and disappear over time. In contrast, another critical aspect to consider about any link is its resilience which does not consider its weight; instead, we are looking for edges whose presence is constant over time, leading us to the following definitions.

<sup>[14]</sup> In general, the number of vertices is not set from the beginning since vertices can pop in and out of existence depending on the analysed phenomenon; in our case, the set is fixed as we consider the same collection of firms for the whole period under study.




Figure 5: Skeleton of a dynamic network.

In a dynamic network, an edge is *resilient* if it appears in the network at every point during the studied period; that is, in every network of the sequence. The set containing all resilient edges and their corresponding vertices forming a network is called the *skeleton* of its respective dynamic network. When dealing with weighted networks, we define the weight of each edge in the skeleton as the mean of the corresponding weights in the dynamic network sequence. Figure 5 shows a dynamic network sequence labelled by day, and the respective network skeleton. The weights of the edges are calculated as explained above.

## 5 Results and Analysis

From the cDCC-GARCH model, and after applying the GGM, we obtained partial correlation matrices related to 1,201 days. From here, we can construct 1,201 individual networks, one per day; this grants us a broader scope for depicting the behaviour of the dynamic network over time. In addition, we analysed the period around the Covid-19 pandemic, where we considered four stages, Sans-Covid, Pre-Covid, During-Covid and Post-Covid. The corresponding periods are from January 2016 to October 2019, November 2019 to February 2020, March to June 2020, and July to September 2020, which throughout this paper we will refer to as Sans, Pre, Dur, and Post, respectively.

For a better visualization, understanding and interpretation of each network, we set the

partial correlations between (-0.0558,0.0558) equal to zero. The cutoff value 0.0558 corresponds to a 10% confidence level in a Fisher's test for the significance of partial correlations. (See Fisher et al., 1924).

While calculating the distances in the network, we encountered negative cycles when using the net data, which makes it impossible to measure distances. To avoid these negative cycles, it is necessary to consider only positive and absolute weights for calculating any distance-related parameter (radius, diameter, average distance, betweenness, closeness, and harmonic centralities).




Figure 6: Weights of Positive and Negative Edges. Source: Authors' calculations.

#### 5.1 Global Measures

A first glimpse into the network structure can be made by analysing the number of edges and their weights (Table 1). Over the 1,201 days, the mean number of edges in the network was 13,227 and always stayed between 22.6% and 24.7% of the total possible edges (54,615).

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Positive edges	7245.7	6818	7397
Negative edges	5981.8	5547	6145
Total edges	13227.5	12365	13504
Normalised total edges	0.242	0.226	0.247
Positive weights	615.6	574.6	627.2
Negative weights	-467.7	-482.3	-427.1
Total (absolute) weights	1083.3	1001.7	1107.7
% Positive edges	54.8	54.2	55.341
% Positive weight	56.8	56.4	57.443

Table 1: Edge weight and edge count

*Notes:* Number of edges and their aggregated weight by type, positive and negative. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

It is worth noticing that the number of positive weighted edges against the total is remarkably stable since it remained around the 54.7% during the whole period, deviating by no more than 0.57%, which implies that the numbers of negative and positive edges are closely related. This relation extends to their weights, where positive edges represent 56.8% with a maximum deviation of 0.62%. The negative and positive edges almost behave like a mirror of each other, as shown in Figure 6 where we plotted the aggregate weights against time.




Figure 7: Partial correlation distribution. On the right side, we can see subfigures showing a zoom of the tails distribution. Above, the left tail, where the maximum negative value is -0.24; and below, the right tail, with the maximum positive value of 0.68 *Source:* Authors' calculations.

In Figure 7, we can observe that almost half of the relations in each network are negative; in fact, the maximum magnitude is -0.24. The proportion of negative weights affects the net

weights since they counterweight the strength of instability phenomena. Moreover, Figure 9 shows how the positive weights and the absolute value of the weights have similar behaviour, just transferred to a different scale.

On the other hand, we can observe that before the beginning of the Pre period there is a meaningful shortage in the average path length. However, this decline was gradual since May 2018 and reached its lowest value in February 2019. Again, in the Dur period, there is a sudden increase followed by a sudden decay in the length of the shortest path, as shown in Figures 10 and 11. This behaviour suggests that although there was no increase in connectedness, there was an inconstancy alternation in the intensity of existing relationships. In the network of positive values, we do not find a visible change in the behaviour of the radius and diameter over time. In the network of absolute values, specifically the radius, a more pronounced peak is perceived just inside the Dur dates.

On average, the positive and absolute networks have average distance, radius, and diameter of 16.7, 20.8, and 25.8, and 18.5, 23.3, and 29.2, respectively. We notice in Table 2 that the radius is greater than the average distance in every case. This is important given that the radius is the minimum distance that needs to be travelled from a particular vertex to cover the network. Therefore, for this network, we need the radius and diameter to determine boundaries. In addition to the average distance, these parameters give us a broader description of the network's topology.

Table 2: Global Measures

Network	Parameter	Mean	Min.	Max.
Pos	$\overline{d}(G)$	18.53	18.36	21.66
	rad(G)	23.33	22.29	27.53
	diam(G)	29.22	27.97	37.17
Abs	$\overline{d}(G)$	16.65	16.51	18.9
	rad(G)	20.83	19.69	24.30
	diam(G)	25.79	24.74	30.73

*Notes:* Positive and absolute network global parameters for 2016-2020. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

	Inc	dustry	Cou	intry
Centrality	Max.	Code	Max.	Code
$C_E^{abs}$	0.061	BLD	0.058	ES
$C_E^+$	0.060	BVG	0.059	ES
$C_D^{net}$	1.273	THQ	1.146	PT
$C_D^{abs}$	7.278	REX	6.932	ES
$C_D^+$	4.070	THQ	3.977	ES
$C_C^{abs}$	0.062	ALU	0.061	$\mathrm{CH}$
$C_C^+$	0.057	COM	0.055	ES
$C_H^{abs}$	21.98	SEM	21.34	ES
$C_H^+$	20.24	SEM	19.34	ES
$C_B^{abs}$	0.005	FRP	0.004	FI
$C_B^+$	0.006	FRP	0.004	BE

Table 3: Top 1 centralities, by industry and country

*Notes:* Top 1 average centralities by industry and country from 2016-2020. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

#### 5.2 Local Measures

To analyse the centralities of the dynamic networks (with positive and absolute weights), we took as a basis the average centrality per day of the degree, closeness, harmonic, betweenness, and eigenvector<sup>[15]</sup> centralities. In the case of degree centrality, we also calculated the net value.

We considered the mean of each centrality measure by industry, obtaining eleven centrality measures for each industry. The highest of each of the centrality measures constitutes the top 1 highest centrality measures by industry. We used an equal treatment to calculate the top 1 highest centrality measures by country. Of the top 1 with highest centralities by industry, shown in Table 3, we noticed that three industries stand out: the Computers & Peripherals and Office Electronics (THQ) for net and positive degree centralities; the Semi-conductors & Semiconductor Equipment (SEM) in both harmonic centralities; and Paper & Forest Products industries (FRP) in both betweenness centralities.

In the case of the top 1 by country, in Table 3, Spain excels for seven centrality measures  $(C_E^{abs}, C_E^+, C_D^{abs}, C_D^{pos}, C_C^+, C_H^{abs})$  and  $(C_H^+)$ , representing 7/11 of the firms with the highest centralities.

<sup>[15]</sup> The obtained net partial correlation matrices with cut-off are not positive definite for all periods, and the obtained eigenvector centralities present positive and negative values, which does not allow us to rank the firms according to their influence on the network.

Considering the positive and absolute networks, from the Top 20 of the highest centralities<sup>[16]</sup>, only the sixth and seventh firms, respectively, transmitted simultaneously positive and negative effects, please see Table 4. And from this only three, STERV.HE, CABK.MC and SSE.L, appear in the eleven tables simultaneously.

Table 4:	Simultaneous	effects	oţ	centralities	in	the	Top 2	20

		Co	$\mathbf{Code}$						
	Tickers	Ind.	Ctry.	Cap	$C_C$	$C_H$	$C_E$	$C_B$	$C_D$
Abs	CFR.SW	TEX	СН	0.395	0.067	23.896	0.073	0.01	8.583
	BBVA.MC	BNK	ES	0.359	0.066	23.213	0.069	0.007	8.277
	CABK.MC	BNK	ES	0.181	0.066	23.422	0.071	0.01	8.606
	SSE.L	ELC	GB	0.19	0.066	22.985	0.074	0.007	8.700
	UPM.HE	FRP	FI	0.178	0.065	23.179	0.067	0.008	7.963
	STERV.HE	FRP	FI	0.086	0.065	23.182	0.072	0.008	8.689
	TUI1.DE	TRT	DE	0.072	0.064	22.513	0.072	0.006	8.696
	HNR1.DE	INS	DE	0.225	0.064	22.484	0.066	0.006	7.886
	DGE.L	BVG	GB	1.052	0.064	22.549	0.069	0.006	8.272
Pos	BBVA.MC	BNK	ES	0.359	0.06	21.361	0.069	0.01	4.6415
	STERV.HE	FRP	FI	0.086	0.06	21.394	0.075	0.012	5.120
	CABK.MC	BNK	ES	0.181	0.06	21.112	0.074	0.011	5.082
	CFR.SW	TEX	$\mathrm{CH}$	0.395	0.06	21.306	0.071	0.01	4.778
	SSE.L	ELC	GB	0.19	0.059	20.891	0.076	0.01	5.080
	INVE-B.ST	FBN	SE	0.24	0.058	20.363	0.07	0.009	4.799
	HNR1.DE	INS	DE	0.225	0.058	20.536	0.067	0.008	4.541

*Notes:* Most relevant centralities simultaneously for positive and absolute values, respectively. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

Taking into account the market capitalization by industry, the twelve most capitalised industries represent 59.8% and constitute 45.9% of the firms (Table 26). On the other hand considering it by country, United Kingdom, France, Switzerland, and Germany represent 70.7% of market capitalization and host 62.2% of the firms (Table 30). We can notice that in both partitions, the countries or industries with the highest centralities are not precisely the most capitalised.

On the other hand, when analysing the network's connectedness again by its constituents, the United Kingdom's connections remained unaffected in their number and their strength by the effect of the pandemic. France and Germany have a slight increase in number and

 $<sup>^{[16]}</sup>$ The comprehensive Top 20 highest centralities are in Tables: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.

strength of connections in the Pre and Dur periods. Austria was the country which strengthened its relations the most, although it has only one connection. We present these results in Table 31.

In addition, we observe in Table 31 that all but two countries, Ireland and Luxembourg, have a standardised number of edges greater than the average per day for the whole network, 24.2%. This is a clear indication of homophilic behaviour. Therefore, we reviewed the number of connections between industries, please see Table 32. We took 12 firms, representing 50% of the index constituents, and we noticed the same behaviour.

## 5.3 Homophily

To generate the homophily profile, we established an increasing sequence of cut-offs to obtain the links that represent the stronger relations between firms. It is worth mentioning that those cut-offs are applied to the absolute value of the edge weight. For instance, two links with weight 0.4 and -0.4 represent equally strong relations, but not of the same kind. Since to calculate the homophilic ratio and profile, we only take into account the magnitude of the links, regarding the homophilic representation, the net and absolute networks are the same, regardless of the subsets of nodes considered. Moreover, we know that the partial correlations are in the interval [-0.24, 0.68]; therefore, the positive network will also be the same as the net and absolute ones for values greater than |-0.24|. Also, we studied homophily over two distinct partitions of the vertex set of the network: by country and by industry. In both cases, we calculated the homophily ratio for the 1,201 days of period.

Dividing the firms by country, we obtain a homophily baseline of 0.125 and the homophily ratio of the networks exhibited in Table 5. It is clear not only that each homophily index exceeds the baseline, but the homophily index is higher in each network, under stronger edges. Hence, once we reach a cut-off of 0.45, every existing link is between firms belonging to the same country for every daily network.

		$\mathrm{Net}/\mathrm{Abs}$				Pos	
Cut-	Mean	Min	Max		Mean	Min	Max
$ m offs^{[17]}$							
0.05	0.149	0.145	0.153		0.192	0.187	0.197
0.1	0.214	0.201	0.229		0.290	0.271	0.308
0.15	0.469	0.433	0.512		0.528	0.486	0.568
0.2	0.670	0.621	0.718		0.674	0.626	0.723
0.25	0.745	0.703	0.779		0.745	0.703	0.779
0.3	0.755	0.714	0.816		0.755	0.714	0.816
0.35	0.814	0.778	0.852		0.814	0.778	0.852
0.4	0.947	0.857	1.0		0.947	0.857	1.0
0.45	1.0	1.0	1.0		1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 5: Homophily ratios by country.

*Notes:* The mean, minimum and maximum for the whole period of 1,201 days are presented for the net/absolute data on the left, and positive data on the right. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

Considering the division of firms by the respective industry, we have a baseline homophily equal to 0.028 and, as in the previous case, all homophily ratios are above the baseline, and again, as the strength of the links we consider increases, the homophily increases as well, reaching full homophily with a cut-off of 0.55 in every daily skeleton.

As a result, we found that the stronger relations tend to be established between firms that belong to the same country and industry. This finding can also be observed visually in Figures 12 and 13, where most of these strong connections are within sectors or within countries [18].

<sup>[17]</sup> Recall that by using Fisher's transformation we applied a cut-off of 0.558 since the beginning, then the first cut-off for tables 5 and 6 correspond to all the edges in the studied networks.

<sup>[18]</sup> A cut-off value equal to 0.3 was applied in these networks, i.e., only links between firms whose partial correlation was greater than or equal to 0.3 were drawn. In each figure, there are networks for the Pre, Dur, and Post periods where the colour of a node corresponds to the country or industry that it belongs to, respectively.

		Net/A	bs		Pos	
Cut-	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
$offs^{[19]}$						
0.05	0.051	0.049	0.053	0.083	0.079	0.087
0.1	0.141	0.131	0.160	0.217	0.204	0.242
0.15	0.554	0.519	0.611	0.633	0.584	0.683
0.2	0.843	0.802	0.876	0.848	0.809	0.876
0.25	0.869	0.831	0.897	0.869	0.831	0.897
0.3	0.892	0.846	0.929	0.892	0.846	0.929
0.35	0.888	0.875	0.900	0.888	0.875	0.900
0.4	0.904	0.800	0.944	0.904	0.800	0.944
0.45	0.905	0.889	0.917	0.905	0.889	0.917
0.5	0.945	0.833	1.0	0.945	0.833	1.0
0.55	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0

Table 6: Homophily ratios by industry.

*Notes:* The mean, minimum and maximum for the whole period of 1,201 days are presented for the net/absolute data on the left, and positive data on the right. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

#### 5.4 Skeleton

We consider the skeletons of each data type encompassing the whole time frame. We also construct the skeletons for each of the Covid related periods (Whole, Sans, Pre, Dur, and Post) to examine if there is another piece of evidence about the impact of the pandemic onto the topology of the network.

		Whole	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
Net	Count	13227.5	13223.3	13273.8	13211.9	13255.9
	Weight	147.8	147.9	146.7	147.4	148.3
Abs	Count	13227.5	13223.3	13273.8	13211.9	13255.9
AUS	Weight	1083.3	1083.1	1086.0	1081.7	1085.1
Pog	Count	7245.7	7245.2	7257.8	7230.5	7260.1
Pos	Weight	615.6	615.5	616.4	614.6	616.7

Table 7: Daily Networks - Edge Statistics

Notes: Average by Covid related periods. Source: Authors' calculations.

When looking into the daily networks' average statistics (Table 7), we notice no particular change in its number of edges or its added weight.

Since the Pre and Dur periods include precisely 84 days, we divided the Sans period

into 84-day intervals (from March 2016 to February 2020). We compute the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the first twelve uniformly divided periods, and by comparing these against the values of the Dur skeleton (Table 8), we can see that the measures of the Dur period are above the maximum or below the observed minimum for the previous periods. In fact, the edge count and weight of the Dur period are higher than the corresponding maximum of the other periods. In contrast, all its other measures are lower than the respective minimum, with only one exception, the diameter of the absolute data.

Table 8: 84-Day Skeletons – Global Measures

		Ma	rch 2016 to	o Februa:	ry 2020	
		Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max	Dur
	Edges					
Net	Count	6716.00	217.47	6349	7155	8160
	Weight	130.33	2.74	125.17	135.27	140.00
	W/C	0.019	0.001	0.018	0.020	0.017
	Count	6716.00	217.47	6349	7155	8160
Abs	Weight	649.01	18.38	619.82	687.20	756.96
	W/C	0.097	0.001	0.096	0.098	0.093
	Count	3864.83	111.39	3668	4063	4650
Pos	Weight	389.67	9.33	374.17	407.04	448.48
	W/C	0.101	0.001	0.100	0.102	0.096
	Distance					
	$\overline{d}(G)$	17.37	0.10	17.14	17.50	17.07
$\mathbf{Abs}$	rad(G)	21.71	0.30	21.08	22.03	21.03
	$\operatorname{diam}(G)$	27.59	0.34	26.96	28.12	27.66
	$\overline{d}(G)$	19.47	0.12	19.23	19.63	19.07
Pos	rad(G)	24.43	0.42	23.92	25.05	23.74
	diam(G)	31.37	0.73	30.53	33.45	29.62

Notes: We show the edge count, edge weight, and ratio (weight over count), average distance, radius, and diameter for each corresponding network kind. We have the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the first twelve 84-day skeletons in the first four columns. At the same time, the last column shows the respective values for the last period, Dur, which goes from March to June 2020. Source: Authors' calculations.

So, even when there is no remarkable change in the edge count and weight of the overall network (Table 7), it is noteworthy that the number of resilient edges in the Dur period is

over 14% higher than the maximum in the previous 84-Day Skeleton's intervals (Table 8). This finding implies that the number of relations did not substantially change, but their stability increased.

While studying the centralities of the skeletons corresponding to the Covid periods, we observe two types of behaviour. On the one hand, rankings of degree and eigenvector centralities did not maintain much stability, while closeness, harmonic, and betweenness were pretty stable during all periods.

	Ticker	Total	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
Net	BN.PA	1.93	1.93	1.76	2.38	1.98
net	SU.PA	1.59	1.68	1.83	1.76	2.14
	CABK.MC	3.96	4.04	6.04	7.17	6.30
$\mathbf{Abs}$	CFR.SW	3.38	3.47	5.52	6.45	6.02
	SSE.L	3.32	3.49	5.35	6.83	6.72
	CABK.MC	2.60	2.68	3.77	4.45	3.96
Pos	STERV.HE	2.47	2.55	3.41	3.65	3.64
	SSE.L	2.16	2.16	3.48	4.31	4.41
	ATCO-A.ST	2.06	2.14	3.24	3.59	3.57

Table 9: Simultaneous Top 20 (Degree Centrality)

*Notes:* Simultaneous Degree Centrality of the Top 20 firms for every period for net, absolute and positive data. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

	Ticker	Total	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
	CABK.MC	0.101	0.099	0.081	0.083	0.071
$\mathbf{Abs}$	CFR.SW	0.098	0.095	0.079	0.079	0.075
	SSE.L	0.092	0.092	0.079	0.084	0.081
	DGE.L	0.085	0.085	0.073	0.072	0.073
	ATL.MI	0.084	0.084	0.077	0.088	0.078
Pos	BBVA.MC	0.113	0.11	0.076	0.079	0.076
Pos	CABK.MC	0.109	0.107	0.085	0.089	0.076
	DGE.L	0.099	0.098	0.074	0.072	0.071
	CFR.SW	0.097	0.091	0.079	0.074	0.072
	ATCO-A.ST	0.091	0.089	0.076	0.072	0.073

Table 10: Simultaneous Top 20 (Eigenvector Centrality)

*Notes:* Simultaneous Eigenvector Centrality of the Top 20 firms for every period for absolute and positive data. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

As we can see in Table 9, no firm simultaneously appears in the top 20 of the three types of data. When we consider the top 30 rankings, one firm accomplishes the simultaneous occurrence, namely, CABK.MC, whose net degree centralities are 1.24, 1.32, 1.5, 1.74, and 1.62 for the Total, Sans, Pre, Dur and Post periods, respectively.

In contrast, when considering all types of data available for the eigenvector centrality, three firms appear simultaneously in the top 20 rankings, CABK.MC, CFR.SW, and DGE.L.

We should notice that CABK.MC appears simultaneously in the degree and eigenvector centrality (positive and absolute networks), which means that it is one of the most influential firms in the skeleton network.

Table 11: Simultaneous Top 10 (Closeness Centrality)

	Ticker	Total	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
	CFR.SW	0.061	0.061	0.065	0.066	0.065
	BBVA.MC	0.061	0.061	0.064	0.065	0.065
$\mathbf{Abs}$	CABK.MC	0.060	0.060	0.064	0.066	0.065
ADS	SSE.L	0.059	0.060	0.063	0.065	0.064
	UHR.SW	0.059	0.059	0.063	0.063	0.063
	GLE.PA	0.059	0.059	0.063	0.064	0.064
	BBVA.MC	0.055	0.055	0.058	0.060	0.059
	CABK.MC	0.054	0.054	0.058	0.059	0.058
	STERV.HE	0.053	0.053	0.058	0.058	0.057
$\mathbf{Pos}$	CSGN.SW	0.053	0.054	0.057	0.058	0.058
	GLE.PA	0.053	0.053	0.057	0.058	0.057
	CFR.SW	0.052	0.052	0.057	0.058	0.058
	SSE.L	0.052	0.052	0.057	0.058	0.058

*Notes:* Simultaneous Closeness Centrality of the Top 10 firms for every period for absolute and positive data types. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

Table 12: Simultaneous Top 10 (Harmonic Centrality)

	Table 12. Diminionicous 10p 10 (Harmonic Centrality)							
	Ticker	Total	Sans	$\operatorname{Pre}$	Dur	Post		
Abs	CFR.SW	22.00	22.10	23.19	23.43	23.25		
	BBVA.MC	21.58	21.62	22.63	23.03	22.98		
	CABK.MC	21.57	21.60	22.87	23.40	23.02		
	UPM.HE	21.22	21.25	22.79	22.73	22.50		
	UHR.SW	21.13	21.19	22.20	22.43	22.47		
	STERV.HE	21.06	21.17	22.69	22.55	22.36		
	SSE.L	21.06	21.18	22.18	22.75	22.51		
	GLE.PA	21.00	21.01	22.06	22.70	22.45		
Pos	BBVA.MC	19.74	19.76	20.76	21.25	20.96		
	CABK.MC	19.38	19.42	20.56	21.03	20.44		
	STERV.HE	19.31	19.42	20.83	20.88	20.55		
	CSGN.SW	19.17	19.34	20.38	20.62	20.49		
	CFR.SW	19.02	19.06	20.61	20.77	20.69		
	GLE.PA	18.79	18.81	20.01	20.44	20.29		
	UPM.HE	18.74	18.79	20.47	20.51	20.19		

*Notes:* Simultaneous Harmonic Centrality of the Top 10 firms for every period for absolute and positive data types. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

In contrast, five firms, BBVA.MC, CABK.MC, CFR.SW, GLE.PA and SSE.L, appear in the Top 10 of the closeness centrality ranking for every period and every data type (see Table 11). For the harmonic centrality, six firms consistently appear in all top 10 rankings, namely, CFR.SW, BBVA.MC, CABK.MC, GLE.PA, STERV.HE and UPM.HE (Table 12). Moreover, BBVA.MC, CABK.MC, CFR.SW, CSGN.SW, and STERV.HE are always present in the top 10 of betweenness centrality despite data type and period (Table 13). So three firms, BBVA.MC, CABK.MC, and CFR.SW, accomplished being in each top 10 ranking of three centralities of every skeleton by period.

	Ticker	Total	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
Abs	CABK.MC	0.017	0.017	0.012	0.013	0.012
	CFR.SW	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.011	0.009
	BBVA.MC	0.014	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.009
	CSGN.SW	0.014	0.014	0.009	0.008	0.008
	UPM.HE	0.013	0.012	0.010	0.009	0.009
	STERV.HE	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.008	0.008
Pos	BBVA.MC	0.022	0.020	0.012	0.013	0.012
	CABK.MC	0.021	0.021	0.014	0.014	0.012
	STERV.HE	0.020	0.020	0.015	0.013	0.012
	SSE.L	0.019	0.018	0.012	0.012	0.012
	CSGN.SW	0.019	0.020	0.012	0.011	0.010
	BAS.DE	0.017	0.016	0.011	0.010	0.012
	CFR.SW	0.016	0.015	0.013	0.011	0.010

Table 13: Simultaneous Top 10 (Betweenness Centrality)

*Notes:* Simultaneous Betweenness Centrality of the Top 10 firms for every period for absolute and positive data types. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

Finally, as in the case of daily networks in Section 5.3, we observed that the stronger ties in the network have homophilic behaviour, since the homophilic ratios are greater in every instance than the respective homophilic baselines of 0.125 for countries and 0.028 for industries. When taking different thresholds for edge strength we observe that the homophilic ratio also increased as the cut-off also increased (see Figures 14 and 15). Moreover, by comparing the homophily ratios of skeletons (Table 14) and daily networks (Tables 5 and 6), we observed that skeletons always have greater homophily ratios than the mean of their respective daily networks. In fact, when considering the partition by industries, the homophily in the skeletons exceeds the maximum homophily of the daily networks for each cut-off. Therefore, we can say that resilient edges tend to be more homophilic; in other words, stable relations are more likely to form when firms share the same country and industry. [20]

<sup>[20]</sup> Notice that this is a network derived from the relations of the stock returns. In this context, an edge is formed between two stocks because they reacted similarly or oppositely to some news. Whether there is trade or some other exchange between these firms is outside of the focus of this paper.

	Coun	itry	Industry		
Cut-offs	Net/Abs	Pos	Net/Abs	Pos	
0.05	0.199	0.269	0.114	0.180	
0.10	0.227	0.307	0.163	0.244	
0.15	0.488	0.540	0.604	0.674	
0.20	0.692	0.692	0.850	0.850	
0.25	0.758	0.758	0.871	0.871	
0.30	0.750	0.750	0.900	0.900	
0.35	0.815	0.815	0.889	0.889	
0.40	1.0	1.0	0.929	0.929	
0.45	1.0	1.0	0.909	0.909	
0.50	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	

Table 14: Homophily ratios over the skeletons

Source: Authors' calculations.

## 6 Conclusions

We analysed the network's topology derived from the relationships among the firms that constitute the S&P 350 Europe index, using their adjusted closing prices from January 2016 to September 2020. For this, we calculated local and global parameters of the network. The analysis of centralities was carried out through two approaches, first considering daily networks and second using the skeletons – the most resilient relations. In the first one, only three firms were found simultaneously in the top 20 of each of the eleven centralities calculated, so these firms are the ones that best transmitted positive and negative effects during the whole period. These are Scottish & Southern Energy (SSE.L), CaixaBank (CABK.MC), and Stora Enso OYJ R. (STERV.H.). These firms are from the Paper & Forest Products, Banks, and Electric Utilities industries, and they are located in Finland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, respectively. In the second approach, for the degree and eigenvector centralities, no firms were simultaneously present in the top 20 rankings, indicating a lack of stability. At the same time though, closeness, harmonic, and betweenness were pretty stable during all periods, and three firms, managed to appear simultaneously in each top 10 rankings. These firms are Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA.MC) in Spain, CaixaBank (CABK.MC) in Spain, and Compagnie Financière Richemont S.A. (CFR.SW) from Switzerland. The first two are from the bank industry and the third from Textiles, Apparel & Luxury Goods.

Placing the firms with the highest centralities serves to complement the company's risk profile and locate the systemic risk entities. Identifying them allows the corresponding authorities to regulate them.

Using the 84-day skeleton construction, we detected an increase of 20% over the number of resilient relationships during the Covid-19 pandemic, while the total number of edges do not have a similar change. However, we could not conclude whether there was a significant change, either in the number of edges, or in the centrality values over time.

The financial network turned out to be highly homophilic, and in fact, a direct relationship between the partial correlation coefficient and the homophilic ratio was discovered, where the stronger relations tend to be established between firms that belong to the same country and industry. On the same note, homophily ratios of the skeletons proved to be greater than in the daily networks, which suggests resilient relations have a larger proclivity to be homophilic than unstable ones.

This paper can be extended in multiple ways. Although average distance, radius, and diameter help us better understand the power needed to be travelled by a shock to trigger a cascade effect over a network; the fact that, in this case, the radius is always greater than the average distance makes us wonder whether an analysis of average eccentricities would be more useful for a systemic risk analysis than the average distance. In addition, estimating the clustering coefficient could be helpful to measure the density of the neighbourhood of the vertices and the graph, complementing the topological analysis. Furthermore, a skeleton generalisation could be made, allowing flexibility in the absence of connections. On the other hand, we considered an undirected network, preventing us from deriving the causality of the relationships; looking for their causality will be fruitful for a better understanding of the network and its reaction in case of systemic risk.

## A Appendix

## A.1 Radius versus Average Path Length

The graphs shown below are examples where radius and average distance hold different inequality outcomes. In each of them the top vertex can reach any other vertex in at most  $rad(G_i)$  steps for i = 1, 2, 3.

$$1 = rad(G_1) < \overline{d}(G_1) = 1.1$$
$$2 = rad(G_2) > \overline{d}(G_2) = 1.5$$
$$2 = rad(G_3) = \overline{d}(G_3) = 2$$




Figure 8: Graphs where its radius and average distance have different order relationships.

# A.2 Tables and Figures

Tables and figures appear in this section in the same order they were mentioned in the main text.

#### From Section 5.1




Figure 9: Weights over time. Notice there is no change in the behaviour of net weight, positive weight, and absolute weight in the Covid-related periods. *Source:* Authors' calculations.




Figure 10: Global measures over time. Diameter, radius, average distance, and the normalised number of edges, where positive values are considered. *Source:* Authors' calculations.




Figure 11: Global measures over time. Diameter, radius, average distance, and the normalised number of edges, where absolute values are considered. Notice that the normalised number of edges is the same for the net scenario. *Source:* Authors' calculations.

#### From Section 5.2

Table 15: Aver	ra $ae$ $net$ $deare$	ee centrality $C_D^{net}$	- 2016-2020
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Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_D^{net}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
INVE-B.ST	FBN	225	1.956	SE	0.240
BN.PA	FOA	230	1.787	$\operatorname{FR}$	0.548
SN.L	MTC	212	1.779	$_{ m GB}$	0.209
SU.PA	ELQ	214	1.769	$\operatorname{FR}$	0.576
$_{ m LEG.DE}$	$\operatorname{REA}$	205	1.768	$_{ m DE}$	0.078
CBK.DE	BNK	214	1.767	$_{ m DE}$	0.075
AC.PA	TRT	222	1.697	FR	0.122
ZURN.SW	INS	233	1.696	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.595
WEIR.L	IEQ	230	1.669	$_{ m GB}$	0.050
ACA.PA	$\operatorname{BNK}$	229	1.582	FR	0.403
CSGN.SW	FBN	218	1.558	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
CABK.MC	BNK	227	1.557	ES	0.181
STERV.HE	FRP	249	1.551	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
SAF.PA	ARO	235	1.550	FR	0.609
PSN.L	HOM	214	1.531	$_{ m GB}$	0.109
OR.PA	$\cos$	227	1.510	FR	1.590
SY1.DE	$_{\rm CHM}$	218	1.471	DE	0.137
SSE.L	ELC	229	1.460	$_{ m GB}$	0.190
INF.L	PUB	202	1.452	$_{ m GB}$	0.137
ORA.PA	TLS	217	1.439	FR	0.376

*Notes:* The twenty firms with most local influence, considering net degree centrality. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. *Source:* S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 16: Average absolute degree centrality  $(C_D^{abs})$ , 2016-2020

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_D^{abs}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
ATL.MI	$\operatorname{TRA}$	241	8.810	$\operatorname{IT}$	0.186
SSE.L	ELC	229	8.700	$_{ m GB}$	0.190
TUI1.DE	TRT	236	8.696	DE	0.072
STERV.HE	$\operatorname{FRP}$	249	8.689	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	227	8.606	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
CFR.SW	TEX	228	8.583	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
LR.PA	ELQ	226	8.320	FR	0.208
BBVA.MC	BNK	232	8.277	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.359
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	236	8.272	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
BOL.ST	MNX	232	8.191	$_{ m SE}$	0.070
AGS.BR	INS	234	8.130	${ m BE}$	0.113
BRBY.L	TEX	235	8.122	$_{ m GB}$	0.116
KNIN.SW	TRA	217	8.086	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.195
SOLB.BR	$_{\rm CHM}$	238	8.072	${ m BE}$	0.118
LHN.SW	COM	232	8.028	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.329
UPM.HE	FRP	222	7.963	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
EN.PA	CON	236	7.948	FR	0.152
PGHN.SW	REA	226	7.938	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.236
ASML.AS	$_{ m SEM}$	233	7.891	NL	1.211
HNR1.DE	INS	225	7.886	DE	0.225

Notes: The twenty firms with most local influence, considering absolute degree centrality. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_D^+$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
STERV.HE	FRP	126	5.12	FI	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	113	5.082	$\operatorname{ES}$	0.181
SSE.L	ELC	118	5.08	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
INVE-B.ST	FBN	119	4.8	$_{ m SE}$	0.24
CFR.SW	TEX	116	4.778	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
WEIR.L	IEQ	126	4.74	$_{ m GB}$	0.05
ATL.MI	$\operatorname{TRA}$	127	4.711	$\operatorname{IT}$	0.186
BRBY.L	TEX	121	4.679	$_{ m GB}$	0.116
ZURN.SW	INS	119	4.665	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.595
BBVA.MC	BNK	114	4.642	ES	0.359
BN.PA	FOA	115	4.628	FR	0.548
LAND.L	REA	118	4.624	$_{ m GB}$	0.095
OR.PA	$\cos$	112	4.582	FR	1.59
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	107	4.576	$_{ m SE}$	0.323
LR.PA	$\operatorname{EL}\operatorname{\check{Q}}$	119	4.554	FR	0.208
CPG.L	$\operatorname{REX}$	116	4.552	$_{ m GB}$	0.385
HNR1.DE	INS	114	4.541	DE	0.225
KNIN.SW	TRA	111	4.537	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.195
BARC.L	BNK	121	4.535	$\overline{\mathrm{GB}}$	0.393
TUI1.DE	TRT	125	4.533	$\widetilde{\mathrm{DE}}$	0.072

Table 17: Average positive degree centrality  $(C_D^+)$ , 2016-2020

Notes: The twenty firms with most local influence, considering positive degree centrality. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 18: Average absolute closeness centrality ( $C_C^{abs}$ ), 2016-2020

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_C^{abs}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
CFR.SW	TEX	228	0.067	СН	0.395
BBVA.MC	BNK	232	0.066	ES	0.359
CABK.MC	BNK	227	0.066	$\operatorname{ES}$	0.181
SSE.L	ELC	229	0.066	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
UPM.HE	FRP	222	0.065	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
UHR.SW	TEX	232	0.065	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.083
STERV.HE	FRP	249	0.065	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
GLE.PA	INS	241	0.065	FR	0.284
MUV2.DE	INS	213	0.064	DE	0.41
TUI1.DE	TRT	236	0.064	DE	0.072
NG.L	MUW	225	0.064	$_{ m GB}$	0.453
ALV.DE	INS	221	0.064	DE	0.985
ATL.MI	$\overline{TRA}$	241	0.064	$\operatorname{IT}$	0.186
LLOY.L	BNK	217	0.064	$_{ m GB}$	0.561
LHN.SW	COM	232	0.064	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.329
HNR1.DE	INS	225	0.064	DE	0.225
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	236	0.064	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
CSGN.SW	FBN	218	0.064	ĊН	0.333
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	217	0.064	$\dot{ ext{SE}}$	0.323
MC.PA	TEX	220	0.064	FR	2.282

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest closeness centrality, considering absolute values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_C^+$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
BBVA.MC	BNK	114	0.06	ES	0.359
STERV.HE	FRP	126	0.06	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	113	0.06	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
CFR.SW	TEX	116	0.06	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
$_{ m UPM.HE}$	FRP	109	0.059	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
CSGN.SW	FBN	105	0.059	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
GLE.PA	INS	127	0.059	FR	0.284
SSE.L	ELC	118	0.059	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
MUV2.DE	INS	109	0.058	DE	0.41
UHR.SW	TEX	123	0.058	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.083
NG.L	MUW	116	0.058	$_{ m GB}$	0.453
INVE-B.ST	FBN	119	0.058	${ m SE}$	0.24
LHN.SW	COM	118	0.058	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.329
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	107	0.058	${ m SE}$	0.323
IFX.DE	$\operatorname{SEM}$	106	0.058	DE	0.275
HNR1.DE	INS	114	0.058	DE	0.225
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	120	0.058	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
BNP.PA	BNK	107	0.058	FR	0.711
SAN.MC	BNK	101	0.058	ES	0.67
ASML.AS	SEM	121	0.057	NL	1.211

Table 19: Average positive closeness centrality  $(C_C^+)$ , 2016-2020

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest closeness centrality, considering positive values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 20: Average absolute harmonic centrality $(C_{II}^{abs})$ . 201	Table 20 · A	neraae	absolute	harmonic	centralitu	(('''''''')	2016-2020
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Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_H^{abs}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. %
CFR.SW	TEX	228	23.896	СН	0.395
CABK.MC	BNK	227	23.422	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
BBVA.MC	BNK	232	23.213	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.359
STERV.HE	FRP	249	23.182	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
UPM.HE	FRP	222	23.179	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
SSE.L	ELC	229	22.985	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
UHR.SW	TEX	232	22.906	$^{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.083
GLE.PA	INS	241	22.715	FR	0.284
CSGN.SW	FBN	218	22.655	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
ALV.DE	INS	221	22.61	DE	0.985
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	236	22.549	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
TUI1.DE	TRT	236	22.513	DE	0.072
HNR1.DE	INS	225	22.484	$_{ m DE}$	0.225
NG.L	MUW	225	22.384	$_{ m GB}$	0.453
LAND.L	REA	232	22.381	$_{ m GB}$	0.095
MC.PA	TEX	220	22.375	FR	2.282
IFX.DE	$_{\mathrm{SEM}}$	214	22.345	DE	0.275
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	217	22.344	$_{ m SE}$	0.323
VNA.DE	$\operatorname{REA}$	222	22.341	DE	0.282
MUV2.DE	INS	213	22.314	DE	0.41

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest harmonic centrality, considering absolute values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_H^+$	ISO Code	Market Cap. %
STERV.HE	FRP	126	21.394	FI	0.086
BBVA.MC	BNK	114	21.361	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.359
CFR.SW	TEX	116	21.306	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
CABK.MC	BNK	113	21.112	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
UPM.HE	FRP	109	20.954	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
CSGN.SW	FBN	105	20.911	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
SSE.L	ELC	118	20.891	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
IFX.DE	$_{\mathrm{SEM}}$	106	20.678	DE	0.275
GLE.PA	INS	127	20.641	FR	0.284
HNR1.DE	INS	114	20.536	DE	0.225
LAND.L	REA	118	20.516	$_{ m GB}$	0.095
UHR.SW	TEX	123	20.5	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.083
MUV2.DE	INS	109	20.493	DE	0.41
SAN.MC	BNK	101	20.4	ES	0.67
INVE-B.ST	FBN	119	20.363	$_{ m SE}$	0.24
ASML.AS	$_{\mathrm{SEM}}$	121	20.341	NL	1.211
ALV.DE	INS	122	20.305	DE	0.985
NG.L	MUW	116	20.301	$_{ m GB}$	0.453
LLOY.L	BNK	111	20.298	$_{ m GB}$	0.561
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	107	20.297	$_{ m SE}$	0.323

Table 21: Average positive harmonic centrality  $(C_H^+)$ , 2016-2020

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest harmonic centrality, considering positive values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 22: Average absolute eigenvector centrality ( $C_E^{abs}$ ), 2016-2020

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_E^{abs}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. %
ATL.MI	TRA	241	0.074	IT	0.186
SSE.L	ELC	229	0.074	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
CFR.SW	TEX	228	0.073	$^{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
TUI1.DE	TRT	236	0.072	DE	0.072
STERV.HE	FRP	249	0.072	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	227	0.071	ES	0.181
BBVA.MC	BNK	232	0.069	ES	0.359
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	236	0.069	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
LR.PA	ELQ	226	0.069	FR	0.208
BOL.ST	MNX	232	0.068	$_{ m SE}$	0.07
BRBY.L	TEX	235	0.068	$_{ m GB}$	0.116
LHN.SW	COM	232	0.068	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.329
AGS.BR	INS	234	0.067	${ m BE}$	0.113
KNIN.SW	TRA	217	0.067	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.195
PGHN.SW	REA	226	0.067	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.236
EN.PA	CON	236	0.067	FR	0.152
UPM.HE	FRP	222	0.067	${ m FI}$	0.178
ASML.AS	SEM	233	0.066	NL	1.211
SOLB.BR	$_{\rm CHM}$	238	0.066	${ m BE}$	0.118
HNR1.DE	INS	225	0.066	DE	0.225

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest eigenvector centrality, considering absolute values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_E^+$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
SSE.L	ELC	118	0.076	GB	0.19
STERV.HE	$\operatorname{FRP}$	126	0.075	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	113	0.074	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
CFR.SW	TEX	116	0.071	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
BRBY.L	TEX	121	0.07	$_{ m GB}$	0.116
INVE-B.ST	FBN	119	0.07	$_{ m SE}$	0.24
ATL.MI	TRA	127	0.069	$\operatorname{IT}$	0.186
BBVA.MC	BNK	114	0.069	ES	0.359
$_{ m UPM.HE}$	FRP	109	0.069	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
REP.MC	OGX	110	0.068	ES	0.241
WEIR.L	IEQ	126	0.068	$_{ m GB}$	0.05
LR.PA	$\operatorname{ELQ}$	119	0.068	FR	0.208
BN.PA	FOÅ	115	0.068	FR	0.548
PGHN.SW	REA	114	0.067	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.236
ATCO-A.ST	IEQ	107	0.067	$_{ m SE}$	0.323
OR.PA	$\cos$	112	0.067	FR	1.59
HNR1.DE	INS	114	0.067	DE	0.225
ZURN.SW	INS	119	0.067	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.595
TUI1.DE	TRT	125	0.066	DE	0.072
DGE.L	BVG	120	0.066	GB	1.052

Table 23: Average positive eigenvector centrality  $(C_E^+)$ , 2016-2020

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest eigenvector centrality, considering positive values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 24: Average absolute betweenness centrality ( $C_{P}^{abs}$ ), 2016-202	Table 24	Average	absolute	hetweenness	centrality (C	$^{abs}$ ) 2016-202
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Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_B^{abs}$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
AGS.BR	INS	234	0.007	${ m BE}$	0.113
ALV.DE	INS	221	0.007	DE	0.985
BBVA.MC	BNK	232	0.007	ES	0.359
BAS.DE	$_{\rm CHM}$	207	0.007	$_{ m DE}$	0.669
CABK.MC	BNK	227	0.01	$_{\mathrm{ES}}$	0.181
CSGN.SW	FBN	218	0.007	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
$_{ m DGE.L}$	BVG	236	0.006	$_{ m GB}$	1.052
$\mathrm{EZJ.L}$	AIR	233	0.007	$_{ m GB}$	0.072
HNR1.DE	INS	225	0.006	DE	0.225
INVE-B.ST	FBN	225	0.006	$_{ m SE}$	0.24
LAND.L	REA	232	0.006	$_{ m GB}$	0.095
CFR.SW	TEX	228	0.01	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
SSE.L	ELC	229	0.007	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
GLE.PA	INS	241	0.006	FR	0.284
STERV.HE	FRP	249	0.008	$_{ m FI}$	0.086
SY1.DE	$_{\rm CHM}$	218	0.006	DE	0.137
TUI1.DE	TRT	236	0.006	DE	0.072
UPM.HE	FRP	222	0.008	${ m FI}$	0.178
VNA.DE	REA	222	0.006	DE	0.282
ZURN.SW	INS	233	0.006	CH	0.595

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest betweenness centrality, considering absolute values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 25: Average positive betweenness centrality  $(C_E^+)$ , 2016-2020

Ticker	Industry	Num. Edges	$C_E^+$	ISO Code	Market Cap. $\%$
STERV.HE	FRP	126	0.012	FI	0.086
CABK.MC	BNK	113	0.011	ES	0.181
BBVA.MC	BNK	114	0.01	ES	0.359
SSE.L	ELC	118	0.01	$_{ m GB}$	0.19
CFR.SW	TEX	116	0.01	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.395
LAND.L	REA	118	0.009	$_{ m GB}$	0.095
BAS.DE	$_{\rm CHM}$	105	0.009	DE	0.669
CSGN.SW	FBN	105	0.009	$_{\mathrm{CH}}$	0.333
INVE-B.ST	FBN	119	0.009	${ m SE}$	0.24
ALV.DE	INS	122	0.008	DE	0.985
HNR1.DE	INS	114	0.008	DE	0.225
UPM.HE	FRP	109	0.008	$_{ m FI}$	0.178
OR.PA	$\cos$	112	0.007	FR	1.59
LGEN.L	BNK	109	0.007	GB	0.229
LLOY.L	BNK	111	0.007	$_{ m GB}$	0.561
NG.L	MUW	116	0.007	$_{ m GB}$	0.453
SBRY.L	FDR	116	0.007	$_{ m GB}$	0.065
EZJ.L	AIR	121	0.007	GB	0.072
GLE.PA	INS	127	0.007	FR	0.284
BARC.L	BNK	121	0.007	GB	0.393

Notes: The twenty firms with the highest betweenness centrality, considering positive values. The number of edges represents the average number of edges during the whole period 2016-2020. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 26: Average degree centralities, analysis by industry, 2016-202. Part I

Indus-	Market	Num.											
$\operatorname{try}$	$\operatorname{Cap}\%$		$C_E^{abs}$	$C_E^+$	$C_D^{net}$	$C_D^{abs}$	$C_D^+$	$C_C^{abs}$	$C_C^+$	$C_H^{abs}$	$C_H^+$	$C_B^{abs}$	$C_B^+$
DRG	10.72		0.054	0.053	0.852	6.498	3.675	0.06	0.054	20.761	18.703	0.003	0.003
BNK	8.93	27	0.056	0.057	0.953	6.747	3.85	0.061	0.055	21.329	19.373	0.003	0.004
TEX	5.85		0.058	0.057	0.793	6.903	3.848	0.061	0.055	21.396	19.148	0.003	0.004
OGX	5.76	9	0.055	0.055	0.922	6.62	3.771	0.06	0.054	21.067	18.936	0.003	0.004
SNI	5.53	19	0.056	0.057	0.925	6.793	3.859	0.061	0.055	21.328	19.261	0.004	0.004
FOA	4.51	$\infty$	0.054	0.054	0.872	6.553	3.713	0.059	0.053	20.38	18.391	0.002	0.002
BVG	3.60	<b>5</b> 7	0.06	0.06	0.968	7.166	4.067	0.062	0.056	21.742	19.576	0.004	0.004
TLS	3.57		0.053	0.053	0.948	6.363	3.656	0.059	0.053	20.524	18.482	0.002	0.003
FBN	2.92	16	0.053	0.055	1.095	6.367	3.731	0.06	0.054	20.944	19.053	0.003	0.004
AUT	2.85		0.051	0.051	0.932	6.137	3.534	0.059	0.053	20.648	18.617	0.002	0.003
CHM	2.81	15	0.052	0.051	0.849	6.213	3.531	0.059	0.053	20.542	18.585	0.003	0.003
ELC	2.77	9	0.055	0.056	1.032	6.631	3.832	0.061	0.055	21.115	19.098	0.003	0.004
$\cos$	2.74	သ	0.057	0.058	1.111	6.719	3.915	0.061	0.055	21.277	19.331	0.003	0.005
ARO	2.54	7	0.055	0.054	0.856	6.564	3.71	0.06	0.054	20.743	18.668	0.002	0.003

firms per industry. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations. Notes: The first twelve industries represent the 59.81% of participation in terms of market capitalization and in number of

Table 27: Average degree centralities, analysis by industry, 2016-202. Part II

Indus-	Market	Num.											
$\operatorname{try}$	Cap %	$\operatorname{Firms}$	$C_E^{abs}$	$C_E^+$	$C_D^{net}$	$C_D^{abs}$	$C_D^+$	$C_C^{abs}$	$C_{C}^{+}$	$C_H^{abs}$	$C_H^+$	$C_B^{abs}$	$C_B^+$
SOF	2.24	4	0.052	0.049	0.643	6.244	3.443	90.0	0.053	20.728	18.416	0.002	0.003
MNX	2.11	ರ	0.058	0.058	0.915	6.951	3.933	0.062	0.056	21.671	19.74	0.004	0.005
IEQ	2.03	14	0.054	0.053	0.781	6.494	3.638	90.0	0.053	20.806	18.575	0.002	0.003
PRO	1.96	11	0.051	0.051	0.914	6.18	3.547	0.058	0.052	20.155	18.219	0.002	0.002
MUW	1.74	6	0.053	0.052	0.77	6.428	3.599	0.00	0.054	21.171	19.139	0.003	0.004
SEM	1.72	3	0.059	0.06	1.089	7.032	4.061	0.062	0.057	21.982	20.235	0.004	0.005
RTS	1.58	4	0.053	0.052	0.678	6.404	3.541	0.059	0.053	20.617	18.47	0.002	0.003
REA	1.57	11	0.057	0.058	1.051	6.844	3.948	0.062	0.056	21.651	19.618	0.004	0.005
$\operatorname{TRA}$	1.51	9	0.057	0.055	0.72	6.819	3.77	0.00	0.053	20.83	18.512	0.002	0.003
ELQ	1.44	ಬ	0.056	0.056	0.902	969.9	3.799	0.00	0.054	20.909	18.608	0.003	0.003
$_{\rm TOB}$	1.36	3	0.061	0.059	0.787	7.257	4.022	0.062	0.056	21.75	19.783	0.004	0.005
CON	1.33	9	0.059	0.058	0.836	6.979	3.907	0.061	0.055	21.201	19.131	0.003	0.004
IDD	1.32	4	0.054	0.053	0.838	6.555	3.696	0.00	0.054	20.94	18.784	0.003	0.003
PUB	0.95		0.053	0.053	0.901	6.355	3.628	90.0	0.054	20.747	18.865	0.003	0.003

Notes: Twenty nine industries participate with 0.927% or less (per industry) of market capitalisation, representing in total 12.04% of the index total.

Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 28: Average degree centralities, analysis by industry, 2016-202. Part III

Indus-	Market	Num.											
$\operatorname{try}$	Cap %	Firms	$C_E^{abs}$	$C_E^+$	$C_D^{net}$	$C_D^{abs}$	$C_D^+$	$C_C^{abs}$	$C_C^+$	$C_H^{abs}$	$C_H^+$	$C_B^{abs}$	$C_B^+$
MTC	0.93	4	0.054	0.054	0.968	6.394	3.681	0.06	0.054	20.982	18.903	0.003	0.004
FDR	0.91	6	0.054	0.055	1.054	6.597	3.826	0.06	0.055	21.038	19.172	0.003	0.004
COM	0.77	ಏ	0.061	0.06	0.815	7.208	4.012	0.062	0.057	21.714	19.87	0.004	0.005
BLD	0.76	4	0.061	0.058	0.785	7.233	4.009	0.061	0.054	21.122	18.889	0.002	0.003
HOU	0.76	2	0.059	0.058	0.696	7.061	3.879	0.06	0.054	20.714	18.604	0.002	0.002
TSV	0.75	4	0.048	0.048	0.879	5.809	3.344	0.057	0.051	19.858	17.656	0.001	0.002
TCD	0.58	υ <sub>1</sub>	0.05	0.051	1.032	5.999	3.516	0.059	0.053	20.373	18.516	0.002	0.003
REX	0.55	2	0.061	0.059	0.731	7.278	4.005	0.061	0.054	21.413	18.917	0.003	0.004
ATX	0.54	ಬ	0.052	0.051	0.725	6.333	3.529	0.059	0.053	20.452	18.385	0.002	0.003
TRT	0.51	<b>5</b> 7	0.057	0.055	0.829	6.79	3.809	0.06	0.054	21.044	18.82	0.003	0.003
AIR	0.49	4	0.051	0.05	0.761	6.167	3.464	0.06	0.053	21.025	18.756	0.003	0.004
GAS	0.47	ಬ	0.052	0.052	0.899	6.307	3.603	0.061	0.055	21.34	19.197	0.003	0.004
CMT	0.46	2	0.049	0.047	0.558	5.887	3.222	0.058	0.051	20.052	18.007	0.002	0.003
HEA	0.46	2	0.051	0.051	0.838	6.16	3.499	0.06	0.054	20.651	18.642	0.002	0.003

Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 29: Average degree centralities, analysis by industry, 2016-202. Part IV

	$C_B^+$	0.002	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.001
	$C_B^{abs}$	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.001
	$C_H^+$	17.711	19.851	18.265	18.203	19.769	18.121	18.651	18.522	18.965	19.143	18.251	17.312	19.57	16.436
	$C_H^{abs}$	20.162	21.723	20.529	20.164	21.642	20.545	20.488	20.505	21.046	21.181	20.464	19.712	21.441	19.012
	$C_C^+$	0.051	0.056	0.053	0.052	0.056	0.052	0.054	0.053	0.054	0.055	0.053	0.05	0.056	0.048
	$C_C^{abs}$	0.058	0.062	0.059	0.058	0.061	0.059	0.059	0.059	90.0	0.061	0.059	0.057	0.062	0.055
	$C_D^+$	3.126	3.974	3.7	3.209	3.839	3.532	3.397	3.463	3.713	3.856	4.07	3.031	3.738	2.555
	$C_D^{abs}$	5.878	6.85	929.9	5.491	6.531	6.469	5.731	5.731	6.532	6.882	6.867	5.603	6.97	4.96
	$C_D^{net}$	0.375	1.097	0.723	0.927	1.146	0.595	1.063	1.194	0.894	0.831	1.273	0.458	0.505	0.15
	$C_E^+$	0.045	0.059	0.054	0.047	0.056	0.052	0.05	0.05	0.054	0.056	0.059	0.044	0.056	0.035
	$C_E^{abs}$	0.048	0.057	0.056	0.046	0.054	0.054	0.048	0.047	0.055	0.057	0.057	0.046	0.059	0.04
Num.	$\operatorname{Firms}$	3	4	3	2	3	$\vdash$	3	$\vdash$	2	2	П	Н	$\vdash$	Π
Market	$\operatorname{Cap}~\%$	0.44	0.44	0.42	0.29	0.29	0.26	0.21	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07
Indus-	$\operatorname{try}$	LIF	FRP	BLC	ILC	HOM	OGR	ICS	STL	CNO	$\operatorname{CTR}$	THQ	$\overline{IMS}$	ALU	DHP

Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations.

Table 30: Average degree centralities, analysis by country, 2016-202

Market Num. $C_{B}$ Firms $C_{B}$ $C_{E}$ $C_{B}$ $C_{E}$ $C_{B}$ $C_$	LU	PT	$\operatorname{AT}$	ΙE	NO	FI	BE	DK	SE	TI	NL	ES	DE	СН	FR	GB	try	Indus-
Yum. $C_E^{abs}$ $C_F^+$ $C_D^{abs}$ $C_D^+$ $C_D^{abs}$ $C_L^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $C_L^+$ <th< td=""><td>0.22</td><td>0.25</td><td>0.33</td><td>1.12</td><td>1.59</td><td>1.92</td><td>2.52</td><td>2.57</td><td>3.61</td><td>4.52</td><td>5.07</td><td>5.49</td><td>13.29</td><td>13.72</td><td>21.09</td><td>22.70</td><td><math>\operatorname{Cap}</math> %</td><td>Market</td></th<>	0.22	0.25	0.33	1.12	1.59	1.92	2.52	2.57	3.61	4.52	5.07	5.49	13.29	13.72	21.09	22.70	$\operatorname{Cap}$ %	Market
$C_E^+$ $C_{DS}^{net}$ $C_D^+$ $C_D^+$ $C_C^{net}$ $C_H^+$ $C_{BS}^{net}$ $C_H^+$ $C_{BS}^{net}$ 0.054         0.931         6.529         3.73         0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           0.055         0.92         6.626         3.773         0.06         0.054         21.082         18.883         0.003           0.055         0.907         6.574         3.74         0.061         0.054         21.082         18.972         0.003           0.054         0.893         6.474         3.683         0.06         0.054         20.961         18.925         0.003           0.059         1.022         6.932         3.977         0.061         0.055         21.344         19.335         0.003           0.059         1.023         3.765         0.06         0.054         20.969         18.971         0.003           0.051         0.768         6.227         3.497         0.059         0.053         20.656         18.525         0.002           0.054         2.848         18.811         0.003         0.054         20.848         18.811         0.003	2	2	2	∞	7	10											$\operatorname{Firms}$	Num.
$C_{Det}$ $C_{CD}^{bs}$ $C_{C}^{+}$ $C_{CD}^{abs}$ $C_{C}^{+}$ $C_{H}^{abs}$ $C_{H}^{abs}$ $C_{B}^{abs}$ 0.931         6.529         3.73         0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           0.992         6.626         3.773         0.06         0.054         20.953         18.883         0.003           0.997         6.574         3.74         0.061         0.054         20.961         18.925         0.003           0.893         6.474         3.683         0.06         0.054         20.961         18.925         0.003           1.022         6.932         3.977         0.061         0.054         20.969         18.971         0.003           0.768         6.227         3.497         0.059         0.053         20.656         18.525         0.003           0.876         6.478         3.677         0.06         0.054         20.848         18.811         0.003           0.894         6.024         3.411         0.058         0.052         20.223         18.222         0.002           0.895         6.849         3.866         0.061         0.054         20.875	0.05	0.055	0.057	0.055	0.054	0.057	0.057	0.05	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.058	0.054	0.055	0.055	0.054	$C_E^{abs}$	
$C_D^{abs}$ $C_D^+$ $C_C^{abs}$ $C_C^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $C_H^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ 6.529         3.73         0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           6.529         3.73         0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           6.524         3.773         0.061         0.054         21.082         18.972         0.003           6.574         3.683         0.061         0.054         20.961         18.925         0.003           6.474         3.683         0.061         0.055         21.344         19.335         0.003           6.585         3.765         0.06         0.054         20.969         18.971         0.003           6.478         3.677         0.06         0.054         20.848         18.811         0.003           6.849         3.849         0.06         0.054         21.05         18.918         0.003           6.852         3.866         0.061         0.055         21.32         19.145         0.003           6.948         3.411         0.06         0.054         20.875         18.811         0.003           6.	0.05	0.057	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.057	0.056	0.049	0.054	0.051	0.055	0.059	0.054	0.055	0.055	0.054	$C_E^+$	
$C_D^+$ $C_C^{abs}$ $C_C^+$ $C_H^{abs}$ $C_H^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ 3.773         0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           3.773         0.06         0.054         20.953         18.883         0.003           3.774         0.061         0.054         21.082         18.972         0.003           3.683         0.06         0.054         20.961         18.925         0.003           3.765         0.061         0.055         21.344         19.335         0.003           3.765         0.06         0.054         20.969         18.971         0.003           3.477         0.059         0.053         20.656         18.525         0.002           3.849         0.05         0.054         20.848         18.811         0.003           3.849         0.06         0.054         21.005         18.918         0.003           3.849         0.06         0.054         21.32         19.145         0.003           3.678         0.06         0.054         20.875         18.811         0.003           3.643         0.06         0.053         20.771         18.573 <td>0.72</td> <td>1.146</td> <td>0.532</td> <td>0.573</td> <td>0.824</td> <td>0.88</td> <td>0.85</td> <td>0.798</td> <td>0.876</td> <td>0.768</td> <td>0.946</td> <td>1.022</td> <td>0.893</td> <td>0.907</td> <td>0.92</td> <td>0.931</td> <td><math>C_D^{net}</math></td> <td></td>	0.72	1.146	0.532	0.573	0.824	0.88	0.85	0.798	0.876	0.768	0.946	1.022	0.893	0.907	0.92	0.931	$C_D^{net}$	
$C_C^{abs}$ $C_T^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $C_H^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ 0.06         0.054         21.006         18.991         0.003           0.06         0.054         20.953         18.883         0.003           0.061         0.054         21.082         18.972         0.003           0.061         0.055         21.344         19.335         0.003           0.061         0.054         20.969         18.971         0.003           0.059         0.053         20.656         18.525         0.003           0.059         0.054         20.848         18.811         0.003           0.058         0.052         20.223         18.222         0.002           0.06         0.054         21.005         18.918         0.003           0.061         0.055         21.32         19.145         0.003           0.06         0.054         20.875         18.811         0.003           0.06         0.054         20.875         18.811         0.003           0.06         0.053         20.771         18.573         0.003           0.05         20.487         18.51         0.002	6.093	6.515	6.754	6.548	6.531	6.852	6.849	6.024	6.478	6.227	6.585	6.932	6.474	6.574	6.626	6.529	$C_D^{abs}$	
$C_C^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $C_H^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $0.054$ $21.006$ $18.991$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $20.953$ $18.883$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $21.082$ $18.972$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $20.961$ $18.925$ $0.003$ $0.055$ $21.344$ $19.335$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $20.969$ $18.971$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $20.848$ $18.811$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $20.223$ $18.222$ $0.002$ $0.054$ $21.005$ $18.918$ $0.003$ $0.054$ $21.005$ $18.918$ $0.003$ $0.055$ $21.32$ $19.145$ $0.004$ $0.054$ $20.875$ $18.811$ $0.003$ $0.053$ $20.771$ $18.616$ $0.002$ $0.053$ $20.487$ $18.573$ $0.003$ $0.053$ $20.487$ $18.592$ $0.002$ $0.053$ $20.632$ $18.592$ $0.0$	3.407	3.831	3.643	3.56	3.678	3.866	3.849	3.411	3.677	3.497	3.765	3.977	3.683	3.74	3.773	3.73	$C_D^+$	
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.059	0.059	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.061	0.06	0.058	0.06	0.059	0.06	0.061	0.06	0.061	0.06	0.06	$C_C^{abs}$	
$C_H^+$ $C_B^{abs}$ $18.991$ $0.003$ $18.883$ $0.003$ $18.972$ $0.003$ $18.972$ $0.003$ $18.971$ $0.003$ $18.971$ $0.003$ $18.971$ $0.003$ $18.971$ $0.003$ $18.910$ $0.002$ $18.811$ $0.003$ $18.222$ $0.002$ $18.918$ $0.003$ $19.145$ $0.004$ $18.811$ $0.003$ $18.616$ $0.002$ $18.573$ $0.003$ $18.573$ $0.003$	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.054	0.055	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.053	0.054	0.055	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	$C_C^+$	
Cabs 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003	20.632	20.487	20.971	20.771	20.875	21.32	21.005	20.223	20.848	20.656	20.969	21.344	20.961	21.082	20.953	21.006	$C_H^{abs}$	
	18.592	18.51	18.573	18.616	18.811	19.145	18.918	18.222	18.811	18.525	18.971	19.335	18.925	18.972	18.883	18.991	$C_H^+$	
$C_B^+$ $0.004$ $0.003$ $0.004$ $0.004$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.002$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.003$ $0.003$	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	$C_B^{abs}$	
l I	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.004	$C_B^+$	

of firms per industry respectively. Source: S&P Global and authors' calculations. Notes: The first four countries represent the 70.7% and 62.2% of participation in terms of market capitalisation and number

Table 31: Network Description by Country

				Jormaliz	Normalized Weight	lt.	Norma	lized N	Normalized Number of	Edges
OSI	Number	Market		COV	/ID-19			COVI	/ID-19	
code	of firms	Cap. %	Sans	$\operatorname{Pre}$	During	Post	Sans	$\operatorname{Pre}$	During	Post
GB	84	22.7	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.261	0.26	0.261	0.262
FR	51	21.09	0.011	0.01	0.01	0.011	0.283	0.285	0.29	0.283
CH	30	13.72	0.022	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.326	0.325	0.325	0.328
DE	41	13.28	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.274	0.271	0.272	0.28
$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{S}$	18	5.49	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.388	0.4	0.386	0.371
$N\Gamma$	14	05.07	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.018	0.288	0.301	0.313	0.316
LI	19	4.52	0.036	0.036	0.037	0.037	0.407	0.406	0.407	0.413
${ m SE}$	23	3.61	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.026	0.351	0.357	0.352	0.34
DK	11	2.57	0.044	0.042	0.042	0.043	0.51	0.505	0.484	0.486
BE	6	2.52	0.035	0.036	0.035	0.035	0.419	0.439	0.414	0.396
FI	10	1.92	0.049	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.427	0.429	0.431	0.375
ON	7	1.59	0.073	0.073	0.075	0.075	0.578	0.597	0.652	0.614
ΙE	$\infty$	1.12	0.017	0.016	0.017	0.016	0.224	0.206	0.233	0.215
AT	2	0.33	0.149	0.139	0.149	0.161	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
$\operatorname{PT}$	2	0.25	0.108	0.105	0.096	0.123	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
$\Gamma\Omega$	2	0.22	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

to the smallest. The country is represented by its ISO code, followed by the number of firms per sector; it also shows the normalised weight of the edges among the sector and the normalised number of edges, considering net values. Source: S&P Notes: This table shows the country with its corresponding market capitalisation share from the most representative share Global and authors' calculations.

 ${\bf Table~32:~Normalized~Number~of~Edges~per~Industry}$ 

	Firm	Total	Sans	Pre	Dur	Post
BNK	27	$\frac{100a1}{0.344}$	$\frac{0.344}{0.344}$	$\frac{1.16}{0.340}$	$\frac{Du1}{0.351}$	$\frac{1.080}{0.343}$
INS	19	0.344 $0.386$	0.344 $0.385$	0.340 $0.384$	0.398	0.343 $0.392$
FBN	16	0.350	0.359	0.354	0.360	0.360
CHM	15	0.365	0.364	0.387	0.355	0.354
IEQ	14	0.392	0.304	0.386	0.333	0.396
TLS	14	0.352 $0.474$	0.331 $0.474$	0.380 $0.481$	0.412 $0.464$	0.336
REA	11	0.501	0.503	0.484	0.503	0.486
PRO	11	0.342	0.340	0.349	0.360	0.346
DRG	11	0.450	0.452	0.427	0.455	0.444
TEX	10	0.448	0.449	0.421 $0.440$	0.440	0.454
AUT	9	0.440	0.497	0.501	0.479	0.467
ELC	9	0.493	0.497	0.473	0.480	0.460
OGX	9	0.722	0.728	0.700	0.699	0.677
MUW	9	0.432	0.432	0.410	0.424	0.463
FOA	8	0.348	0.343	0.386	0.331	0.391
PUB	7	0.580	0.578	0.589	0.588	0.585
ARO	7	0.641	0.64	0.658	0.659	0.598
FDR	6	0.641	0.643	0.645	0.603	0.650
CON	6	0.412	0.415	0.379	0.392	0.433
TRA	6	0.604	0.603	0.583	0.652	0.572
ELQ	5	0.543	0.545	0.476	0.582	0.538
TRT	5	0.794	0.793	0.800	0.800	0.800
TCD	5	0.639	0.648	0.63	0.600	0.533
BVG	5	0.704	0.705	0.693	0.699	0.700
MNX	5	0.873	0.874	0.839	0.887	0.900
TSV	4	0.391	0.406	0.264	0.339	0.397
BLD	4	0.374	0.378	0.383	0.345	0.337
FRP	4	0.837	0.825	0.865	0.875	0.962
AIR	4	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
MTC	4	0.790	0.784	0.819	0.833	0.785
RTS	4	0.388	0.382	0.383	0.433	0.446
IDD	4	0.390	0.390	0.383	0.363	0.452
SOF	4	0.838	0.842	0.833	0.833	0.785

Notes: Industries with more than 3 firms. Source: Authors' calculations.

#### From Section 5.3





Figure 12: Partial correlation networks coloured by country. For this picture, only edges whose weight is greater than or equal to 0.3 are considered, so the net, absolute and positive networks are the same and depicted here. Source: Authors' calculations.



to 0.3 are considered, so the net, absolute and positive networks are the same and depicted here. Source: Authors' calculations Figure 13: Partial correlation networks coloured by industry. For this picture, only edges whose weight is greater than or equal

#### From Section 5.4




Figure 14: Homophily by country in the net skeleton, each subfigure was drawn using a different cut-off value k, obtaining the homophily ratio hr. Source: Authors' calculations.




Figure 15: Homophily by sector in the net skeleton, each subfigure was drawn using a different cut-off value k, obtaining the homophily ratio hr. Source: Authors' calculations.

## A.3 Tickers, Countries and Industries

Table 33: Firms Part I

			ISO	Industry
Ticker	Firm	Market Cap		
1COV.DE	Covestro AG	7585 350000		CHM
AAL.L	Anglo American PLC	$35532 \ 325635$		MNX
ABBN.SW	ABB Ltd	46631 121398	CH	ELQ
ABF.L	Associated British Foods	24306770982	GB	FOA
ABI.BR	Anheuser Busch Inbev NV	$123000\ 000000$	BE	BVG
ABN.AS	ABN AMRO Group NV	$15246\ 800000$	NL	BNK
AC.PA	Accor	$11274\ 420500$	FR	TRT
ACA.PA	Credit Agricole SA	$37284\ 605325$	FR	BNK
ACS.MC	ACS Actividades de	11217 807250	ES	CON
	Construccion y Servicios SA			
AD.AS	Ahold Delhaize NV	26391 148875	NL	FDR
ADP.PA	ADP Promesses	17427 032100		PRO
ADS.DE	Adidas AG	58080 556800		TEX
AENA.MC	Aena SA	25575 000000		TRA
AGN.AS	Aegon NV	8523 000416		INS
AGS.BR	AGEAS	10450 342320		INS
AHT.L	Ashtead Group	14359 138055		TCD
AI.PA	L'Air Liquide S.A.	59445 121800		CHM
AIR.PA	Airbus SE	101000 000000		ARO
AKE.PA	Arkema	7242 750700		CHM
AKZA.AS	Akzo Nobel NV	20643 260000		CHM
ALFA.ST	Alfa Laval AB	9490 388121		IEQ
ALO.PA	Alstom	9472 357920		IEQ
ALV.DE	Allianz SE	91110 583200		INS
AMS.MC	Amadeus IT Group SA	31396 310400		TSV
ASML.AS	ASML Holding NV	112000 000000		SEM
ASSA-B.ST	Assa Abloy B	22025 237708		BLD
ATCO-A.ST		29893 459353		IEQ
ATL.MI	*	17153 267670		TRA
ATO.PA	Atlantia SpA AtoS SE	8115 372400		TSV
AV.L	Aviva	19478 435620		INS
AV.L AZN.L				
	AstraZeneca PLC	118000 000000		DRG
BA.L	BAE Systems PLC	23152 520936		ARO
BAER.SW	Julius Baer Group	10284 124741		FBN
BALN.SW	Baloise Hldg Reg	7859 340301		INS
BARC.L	Barclays	36376 018151		BNK
BAS.DE	BASF SE	61859 560650		CHM
BATS.L	British American	94014 870214		TOB
BAYN.DE	Bayer AG	67899 111120		DRG
BBVA.MC	Banco Bilbao Vizcaya	$33226\ 080921$	ES	BNK
	Argentaria SA			
BDEV.L	Barratt Developments	8981 456822	GB	HOM
	Tobacco PLC			
BEI.DE	Beiersdorf AG	$26875\ 800000$		COS
BHP.L	BHP Group Plc	$44349\ 528279$		MNX
BIRG.IR	Bank of Ireland Group	$5270\ 162938$	$_{ m IE}$	BNK

Table 34: Firms Part II

Ticker	Firm	Market Cap	ISO Code	Industry Code
BKG.L	Berkeley Group	7860 684449	GB	HOM
BLND.L	Holdings Plc British Land Co	7108 239101	GB	REA
BMW.DE	Bayer Motoren Werke AG (BMW)	44029 914300	DE	AUT
BN.PA	danone	50625 564500	FR	FOA
BNP.PA	BNP Paribas	65744 980290	FR	BNK
BNR.DE	Brenntag AG	7490 160000	DE	TCD
BNZL.L	Bunzl	8190 216743	GB	TCD
BOL.ST	Boliden AB	6478 950144	SE	MNX
BP.L	BP p.l.c	120000 000000	GB	OGX
BRBY.L	Burberry Group	10719 812115	GB	TEX
BT-A.L	BT Group	22669 956904	GB	TLS
BVI.PA	Bureau Veritas SA	10512 101140	FR	PRO
CA.PA	Carrefour SA	12068 626700	FR	FDR
CABK.MC	CaixaBank	16736 063524	ES	BNK
CAP.PA	Capgemini SE	18218 316600	FR	TSV
CARL-B.CO	Carlsberg AS B	15807 271025	DK	BVG
CBK.DE	Commerzbank AG	6909 259086	DE	BNK
CCL.L	Carnival Plc	9321 627486	$\overline{\mathrm{GB}}$	TRT
CFR.SW	Richemont, Cie Financiere A Br	36538 864514	СН	TEX
CHR.CO		9341 145735	DK	LIF
	Christian Hansen Holding A/S	6598 424555	CH	CHM
CLN.SW CLNX.MC	Clariant AG Reg Cellnex Telecom S.A.		ES	TLS
CNA.L	Centrica Centrica	14784 996990 6152 218228	ES GB	MUW
CNA.L CNHI.MI	CNH Industrial NV	13325 257110	IT	
COLO-B.CO		21897 018624	DK	IEQ HEA
COLO-B.CO CON.DE	Coloplast AS B Continental AG		DK DE	ATX
CON.DE CPG.L		23052 691560 35582 324369	GB	REX
CRDA.L	Compass Group Croda Intl		GB	CHM
CRH.L	CRH Plc	7981 408595	GB IE	COM
CS.PA	AXA	28198 133760	FR	
CSGN.SW		60928 360380 30826 778129	гк СН	INS
	Credit Suisse Group AG			FBN
DAILDE	Daimler AG	52817 852690	DE	AUT
DANSKE.CO DASTY	Danske Bank A/S	12437 947310	DK	BNK
	Dassault Systemes SA	38532 098400	FR	SOF
DB DE	Deutsche Bank AG	14295 868841	DE	BNK
DB1.DE DCC.L	Deutsche Boerse AG	26628 500000	DE	FBN
DG.PA	DCC Vinci	7836 826228	IE ED	IDD
	Vinci	59918 562000	FR	CON
DGE.L	Diageo Plc	97310 307888	GB	BVG
DLG.L	Direct Line Insurance Group	5078 020620	GB	INS
DNB.OL	DNB ASA	$26283\ 427706$	NO	BNK
DPW.DE	Deutsche Post AG	$41805 \ 942250$	DE	TRA
DSM.AS	Koninklijke DSM NV	$21063\ 442500$	NL	CHM
DSV.CO	Dsv Panalpina A/s	$24146\ 014608$	DK	TRA
DTE.DE	Deutsche Telekom AG	$69374\ 457630$	DE	TLS
DWNI.DE	Deutsche Wohnen AG BR	$13100\ 456100$	DE	REA
EBS.VI	Erste Group Bank AG	$14424\ 088000$	AT	BNK
EDEN.PA	Edenred	11211 750500	FR	TSV

Table 35: Firms Part III

			ISO	Industry
Ticker	Firm	Market Cap		Code
EDF.PA	Electricite de France	30290 030160	FR	ELC
EDP.LS	Energias de Portugal SA	$11931\ 027360$		ELC
EL.PA	EssilorLuxottica	58853 004000		TEX
ELE.MC	Endesa SA	25187 710080		ELC
ELISA.HE	Elisa Corporation	8190 669000		TLS
ELUX-B.ST	Electrolux AB B	$6571\ 380437$		DHP
EN.PA	Bouygues	$14072\ 723040$		CON
ENEL.MI	Enel SpA	$71827\ 885376$		ELC
ENG.MC	Enagas SA	5428 811160		GAS
ENGI.PA	Engie	$34731\ 072000$		MUW
ENI.MI	ENI SpA	50318 925510		OGX
EOAN.DE	E.ON SE	25155922156		MUW
EQNR.OL	Equinor ASA	$59422\ 071034$		OGX
ERIC-B.ST	Ericsson L.M. Telefonaktie B	$23660\ 551313$		CMT
EXO.MI	EXOR NV	16648 280000		FBN
EXPN.L	Experian Plc	$29221\ 182071$		PRO
EZJ.L	Easyjet	$6659\ 805941$		AIR
FCA.MI	Fiat Chrysler Automobiles NV	$20446\ 042518$		$\operatorname{AUT}$
FER.MC	Ferrovial SA	19942 211340		CON
FERG.L	Ferguson PLC	18780 339920		TCD
FGR.PA	Eiffage	9996 000000	FR	CON
FLTR.L	Flutter Entertainment plc	$8465\ 277150$		CNO
FME.DE	Fresenius Medical Care AG	$20259\ 086320$		HEA
FORTUM.HE		19544 074000		ELC
FP.PA	TOTAL SA	131000 000000		OGX
FR.PA	Valeo	7546 346730		ATX
G.MI	Assicurazioni Generali SpA	$28638\ 458095$		INS
G1A.DE	GEA AG	5320904160		IEQ
GALP.LS	Galp Energia SGPS SA	11490 447900	PT	OGX
GBLB.BR	Groupe Bruxelles Lambert	$15161 \ 197680$		FBN
GEBN.SW	Geberit AG Reg	$18517\ 002581$		$\operatorname{BLD}$
GFC.PA	Gecina	$12155\ 614800$		REA
GFS.L	G4S Plc	$3997\ 388193$		ICS
GIVN.SW	Givaudan AG	$25757\ 519041$		DRG
GLE.PA	Societe Generale	$26292 \ 438995$	FR	INS
GLEN.L	Glencore Plc	$40569\ 355368$		MNX
GLPG.AS	Galapagos Genomics NV	$12060\ 395500$		BTC
GMAB.CO	Genmab AS	$12880 \ 438320$		BTC
GRF.MC	Grifols SA	$13393\ 265900$		BTC
GSK.L	GlaxoSmithKline	113000 000000		DRG
GVC.L	GVC Holdings PLC	$6041\ 813756$		CNO
HEI.DE	HeidelbergCement AG	12889 103360	DE	COM
HEIA.AS	Heineken NV	54674 204760	NL	BVG
HEN3.DE	Henkel AG & Co. KGaA	$16426\ 628600$	DE	HOU
	Nvtg - Pref			
HEXA-B.ST	Hexagon AB	17520 937593		ITC
$\mathrm{HL.L}$	Hargreaves Lansdown Plc	$10846\ 590177$		FBN
HLMA.L	Halma	$9449\ 553980$	GB	ITC
HM-B.ST	Hennes & Mauritz AB B	$26521\ 955023$	SE	RTS
HNR1.DE	Hannover Ruck SE	$20778\ 863100$	DE	INS
HO.PA	Thales	$19586 \ 946600$	FR	ARO
HSBA.L	HSBC Holdings Plc	144000 000000	GB	BNK

Source:  $\overline{\text{S\&P Global and authors.}}$ 

Table 36: Firms Part IV

			ISO	Industry
Ticker	Firm	Market Cap		
IAG.L	International Consolidated	14713 577672	GB	AIR
IMDI	Airlines Group SA	00540 200450	CD	TOD.
IMB.L	Imperial Brands PLC	22548 389450		TOB
IMI.L INDU-A.ST	IMI Industrivarden AB A	3988 017359 5938 978289		PRO FBN
INDU-A.ST INF.L	Informa PLC	12676 181930		PUB
INGA.AS	ING Groep NV	41645 321728		BNK
IBE.MC	Iberdrola SA	58403 820960		ELC
IFX.DE	Infineon Technologies AG	25391 338590		SEM
IHG.L	InterContinental Hotels	11553 634759		TRT
1110.12	Group PLC	11000 001100	GB	1101
III.L	3I Group	12602 800553	GB	FBN
INVE-B.ST	Investor AB B	22195 627041		FBN
ISP.MI	Intesa SanPaolo	41114 341692	$\operatorname{IT}$	BNK
ITRK.L	Intertek Group PLC	11119 592874	GB	PRO
ITV.L	ITV PLC	7183 377677	GB	PUB
ITX.MC	Inditex SA	98018 642500	ES	RTS
$_{ m JMAT.L}$	Johnson, Matthey	7043 813456	GB	CHM
KBC.BR	KBC Group NV	$27961\ 807020$	BE	BNK
KER.PA	Kering	73803 668400	FR	TEX
KGP.L	Kingspan Group PLC	$9888\ 392250$		BLD
KINV-B.ST	Kinnevik Investment AB B	5280 737098		FBN
KNEBV.HE	Kone Corp B	26178 851480		IEQ
KNIN.SW	KUEHNE & NAGEL	18023 105439	СН	TRA
IZDNI A.C.	INTL AG-REG	11055 000504	NIT	TDT C
KPN.AS	Koninklijke KPN NV	11057 682564		TLS
KYGA.L	Kerry Group A	19531 935500		FOA
LAND.L	Land Securities Group PLC			REA
LDO.MI	Leonardo S.p.a. LEG Immobilien AG	6041 667500		ARO
LEG.DE LGEN.L	Legal & General Group	7237 880150 21154 473153		REA BNK
LHA.DE	Deutsche Lufthansa AG	7772 662140		AIR
LHN.SW	LafargeHolcim Ltd	30439 194891		COM
LI.PA	Klepierre	10406 302400		REA
LISN.SW	Lindt & Sprungli AG Reg	10701 218854		FOA
LLOY.L	Lloyds Banking	51831 247152		BNK
LLO1.L	Group PLC	01001 241102	GD	DIVIX
LOGN.SW	Logitech International SA	7301 174195	СН	THQ
LONN.SW	Lonza AG	24206 078639		LIF
LR.PA	Legrand Promesses	19234 418240		ELQ
LSE.L	London Stock	32084 185501		FBN
	Exchange PLC			
LXS.DE	Lanxess AG	5231 139360	DE	CHM
MAERSK-A.CO	AP Moller - Maersk AS A	12997 745612	DK	TRA
MB.MI	Mediobanca SpA	8648 440290	$\operatorname{IT}$	BNK
MC.PA	LVMH-Moet Vuitton	211000 000000	FR	TEX
MCRO.L	Micro Focus International	$4561\ 232100$	GB	PRO
MKS.L	Marks & Spencer Group	$4920\ 181628$	GB	FDR
ML.PA	Michelin CGDE B Brown	$19645\ 200600$	FR	ATX
MNDI.L	Mondi PLC	$10171\ 043700$	GB	FRP
MONC.MI	Moncler SpA	10336 016430		TEX
MOWI.OL	Mowi ASA	11942 557638	NO	FOA

Table 37: Firms Part V

			ISO	Industry
Ticker	Firm	Market Cap	Code	Code
MRK.DE	MERCK KGaA	13615 644700	DE	DRG
MRO.L	Melrose Industries PLC	$13785 \ 236033$	GB	IEQ
MRW.L	Morrison (WM)	$5650\ 440187$	GB	FDR
	Supermarkets			
MT.AS	ArcelorMittal Inc	$15888 \ 392784$	LU	$\operatorname{STL}$
MTX.DE	MTU Aero Engines AG	13239 200000	DE	ARO
MUV2.DE	Munich Re AG	37955 634000	DE	INS
NDA-FI.HE	Nordea Bank Abp	29111 104460	FI	BNK
NESN.SW	Nestle SA Reg	287000 000000	CH	FOA
NESTE.HE	Neste Oyj	$23860\ 956240$	FI	OGR
NG.L	National Grid PLC	$41881\ 362823$	GB	MUW
NHY.OL	Norsk Hydro AS	6848 706583	NO	$\operatorname{ALU}$
NN.AS	NN Group N.V.	$11619\ 063920$	NL	INS
NOKIA.HE	Nokia OYJ	$18561 \ 447072$	FI	CMT
NOVN.SW	Novartis AG Reg	216000 000000	CH	DRG
NOVO-B.CO	Novo Nordisk AS B	96373 738885	DK	DRG
NTGY.MC	Naturgy Energy Group SA	$22044\ 332800$	ES	GAS
NXT.L	Next	11049786129	GB	RTS
NZYM-B.CO	Novozymes AS B	$10350\ 570630$	DK	$_{\rm CHM}$
OCDO.L	Ocado Group PLC	$10685 \ 197490$	GB	RTS
OMV.VI	OMV AG	16389 831840	AT	OGX
OR.PA	L'Oreal	$147000\ 000000$	FR	$\cos$
ORA.PA	Orange	$34750\ 589760$	FR	TLS
ORK.OL	Orkla AS	9034 708498	NO	FOA
PAH3.DE	Porsche Automobil	$10204\ 250000$	DE	AUT
	Holding SE			
PGHN.SW	Partners Group Hldg	$21805 \ 141471$	CH	REA
PHIA.AS	Koninklijke Philips	$39397\ 568000$	NL	MTC
	Electronics NV			
PNDORA.CO	Pandora A/S	$3878\ 179176$	DK	TEX
PROX.BR	Proximus	8626 398000	BE	$\operatorname{ELQ}$
PRU.L	Prudential PLC	$44280\ 510043$	GB	INS
PRY.MI	Prysmian SpA	$5762\ 414560$	$\operatorname{IT}$	$\operatorname{ELQ}$
PSN.L	Persimmon	$10114\ 746939$	GB	HOM
PSON.L	Pearson	5876 $761866$	GB	PUB
PUB.PA	Publicis Groupe	$9701\ 292840$	FR	PUB
QIA.DE	QIAGEN NV	$6913\ 384360$	DE	$\operatorname{LIF}$
RACE.MI	Ferrari NV	$28681\ 211700$	$\operatorname{IT}$	$\operatorname{AUT}$
RAND.AS	Randstad NV	$9960\ 451280$	NL	PRO
RB.L	Reckitt Benckiser	53348 811760	GB	HOU
	Group PLC			
RDSA.L	Royal Dutch Shell PLC	110000 000000	GB	OGX
REE.MC	Red Electrica	$9698\ 859000$	ES	ELC
	Corporacion SA			
REL.L	RELX PLC	$45300\ 422373$	GB	PRO
REP.MC	Repsol SA	$22271\ 158630$	ES	OGX
RI.PA	Pernod-Ricard	$42290\ 573400$	FR	BVG
RIO.L	Rio Tinto PLC	$67920\ 021937$	GB	MNX
RMS.PA	Hermes Intl	$70330\ 067800$	FR	TEX
RNO.PA	Renault SA	$12473\ 553960$	FR	$\operatorname{AUT}$
ROG.SW	Roche Hldgs AG	$203000\ 000000$	$\mathrm{CH}$	DRG
	Ptg Genus			

Table 38: Firms Part VI

	-	3.5.1.0	ISO	Industry
Ticker	Firm	Market Cap		
RR.L	Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC	15590 884245	GB	ARO
RSA.L	RSA Insurance Group PLC	6861 117604		INS
RTO.L	Rentokil Initial	9836 210575		ICS
RWE.DE	RWE AG	16813 303100		MUW
RY4C.IR	Ryanair Holdings PLC	$15859\ 007780$		AIR
SAB.MC	Banco de Sabadell SA	5840 797040		BNK
SAF.PA	Safran SA	56314 955050		ARO
SAMPO.HE	Sampo Oyj A	$21562\ 054320$		INS
SAN.MC	Banco Santander SA	$61985 \ 568950$		BNK
SAN.PA	Sanofi-Aventis	113000 000000		DRG
SAND.ST	Sandvik AB	21857965979		IEQ
SAP.DE	SAP SE	148000 000000		SOF
SBRY.L	Sainsbury (J)	$6008\ 030226$		FDR
SCA-B.ST	SCA - B shares	5774 424878		FRP
SCHN.SW	Schindler-Hldg AG Reg	$14642\ 544020$	CH	IEQ
SCMN.SW	Swisscom AG Reg	$24437\ 307425$		TLS
SCR.PA	SCOR SE	6980 326800	FR	INS
SDR.L	Schroders PLC	8905 494694	GB	FBN
SEB-A.ST	SEB-Skand Enskilda	18219 828720	SE	BNK
	Banken A			
SECU-B.ST	Securitas AB B	$5354\ 462712$	SE	ICS
SESG.PA	SES	$4793\ 225000$	LU	PUB
SEV.PA	Suez SA	8406 050055		MUW
SGE.L	Sage Group	9912 283546		SOF
SGO.PA	Saint-Gobain, Cie de	19940 789500		BLD
SGRO.L	SEGRO PLC	11627 787008		REA
SGSN.SW	SGS-Soc Gen Surveil	18624 735178		PRO
	Hldg Reg			
SHB-A.ST	Svenska Handelsbanken A	18699 691239	SE	BNK
SIE.DE	Siemens AG	99059 000000		IDD
SK3.IR	Smurfit Kappa Group PLC	8096 425980		CTR
SKA-B.ST	SKANSKA AB-B	8072 421673		CON
SKF-B.ST	SKF AB B	7588 180375	$\widetilde{\mathrm{SE}}$	IEQ
SLA.L	Standard Life Aberdeen	9100 512935	GB	FBN
SLHN.SW	Swiss Life Reg	15019 669587		INS
SMDS.L	DS Smith	6209 762969		CTR
SMIN.L	Smiths Group	7829 724427		IDD
SN.L	Smith & Nephew	19295 676774		MTC
SOLB.BR	Solvay	10936 990800		CHM
SOON.SW	Sonova Holding AG	13127 267443		MTC
SPSN.SW	Swiss Prime Site AG	7821 016722		REA
SPX.L	Spirax-Sarco Engineering	7724 540020		IEQ
SREN.SW	Swiss Re Reg	32752 395869		INS
SRG.MI	Snam SpA	15908 224926		GAS
SSE.L	Scottish & Southern Energy	17583 650712		ELC
STAN.L	Standard Chartered	26909 227396		BNK
STERV.HE	Stora Enso OYJ R	7939 610420		FRP
	St James's Place			
STJ.L STM MI	STMicroelectronics NV	7280 987158 21820 346430		FBN
STM.MI STMN.SW		13888 578547		SEM MTC
	Straumann AG Reg Schneider Electric SE			
SU.PA		53251 444500		ELQ
SVT.L	Severn Trent	7138 539011	GD	MUW

Table 39: Firms Part VII

Ticker         Firm         Market Cap         Code         Code           SW.PA         Sodexo         15578 620750         FR         REX           SWED-A.ST         Swedbank AB         15047 719773         SE         BNK           SWMA.ST         Swedish Match AB         7821 532927         SE         TOB           SY1.DE         Symrise AG         12703 052600         DE         CHM           TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL2-B.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA
SW.PA         Sodexo         15578 620750         FR         REX           SWED-A.ST         Swedbank AB         15047 719773         SE         BNK           SWMA.ST         Swedish Match AB         7821 532927         SE         TOB           SY1.DE         Symrise AG         12703 052600         DE         CHM           TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL2-B.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD
SWED-A.ST         Swedbank AB         15047 719773         SE         BNK           SWMA.ST         Swedish Match AB         7821 532927         SE         TOB           SY1.DE         Symrise AG         12703 052600         DE         CHM           TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD
SWMA.ST         Swedish Match AB         7821 532927         SE         TOB           SY1.DE         Symrise AG         12703 052600         DE         CHM           TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEL.DL         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL.AST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC
SY1.DE         Symrise AG         12703 052600         DE         CHM           TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL.D.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TU1
TATE.L         Tate & Lyle         4187 414119         GB         FOA           TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL.S.T         Telea AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UB.PA
TEF.MC         Telefonica SA         32331 405964         ES         TLS           TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL2-B.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UB.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS
TEL.OL         Telenor ASA         23032 664468         NO         TLS           TEL2-B.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG
TEL2-B.ST         Tele2 AB B         8621 912671         SE         TLS           TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG <td< td=""></td<>
TELIA.ST         Telia Company AB         16151 169427         SE         TLS           TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Uniceredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK
TEMN.SW         Temenos Group AG         10213 002525         CH         SOF           TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UH
TEN.MI         Tenaris SA         11864 396850         IT         OGX           TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI
TEP.PA         Teleperformance         12735 509400         FR         PRO           TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS
TIT.MI         Telecom Italia SpA         8459 017637         IT         TLS           TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp AG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE
TKA.DE         ThyssenKrupp ÅG         7495 285280         DE         IDD           TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FR           URW.AS
TPK.L         Travis Perkins         4730 642257         GB         TCD           TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           U
TRN.MI         Terna SpA         11913 412186         IT         ELC           TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FR           URV.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS
TSCO.L         Tesco         29294 351743         GB         FDR           TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW
TUI1.DE         TUI AG         6612 159756         DE         TRT           UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MU
UBI.PA         Ubisoft Entertainment SA         6939 327040         FR         IMS           UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
UBSG.SW         UBS Group AG         43098 836809         CH         FBN           UCB.BR         UCB SA         13790 475400         BE         DRG           UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
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UCG.MI         Unicredit SpA Ord         28956 662280         IT         BNK           UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
UG.PA         Peugeot SA         19272 836400         FR         AUT           UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
UHR.SW         Swatch Group AG-B         7663 132882         CH         TEX           UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
UMI.BR         Umicore         10683 904000         BE         CHM           UNA.AS         Unilever NV         79136 415440         NL         COS           UPM.HE         UPM-Kymmene Oyj         16448 725590         FI         FRP           URW.AS         Unibail Rodamco Westfield         19358 644050         FR         REA           UTDI.DE         United Internet AG Reg         6002 400000         DE         TLS           UU.L         United Utilities Group Plc         7602 365565         GB         MUW           VIE.PA         Veolia Environnement         13332 180420         FR         MUW
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UU.LUnited Utilities Group Plc7602 365565GBMUWVIE.PAVeolia Environnement13332 180420FRMUW
VIE.PA Veolia Environnement 13332 180420 FR MUW
vii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
VIV.PA Vivendi SA 30564 528280 FR PUB
VNA.DE Vonovia SE 26029 152000 DE REA
VOD.L Vodafone Group 49971 317452 GB TLS
VOLV-B.ST Volvo AB B 24537 431397 SE AUT
VOW.DE Volkswagen AG 51124 342500 DE AUT
VWS.CO Vestas Wind Systems AS 17918 957786 DK IEQ
WDI.DE Wirecard AG 13275 282500 DE FBN
WEIR.L Weir Group 4631 300556 GB IEQ
WKL.AS Wolters Kluwer NV 17751 500320 NL PRO
WPP.L WPP Plc 16725 083182 GB PUB
WRT1V.HE Wartsila Oyj ABP 5828 501100 FI IEQ
WTB.L Whitbread 8407 368452 GB TRT
YAR.OL Yara International ASA 10188 092051 NO CHM
ZURN.SW Zurich Insurance Group AG 55011 937615 CH INS

Table 40: Countries

ISO Code	Country	ISO Code	Country	ISO Code	Country
AT	Austria	FI	Finland	NL	Netherlands
${ m BE}$	Belgium	FR	France	NO	Norway
$\mathrm{CH}$	Switzerland	GB	United Kingdom	PT	Portugal
DE	Germany	IE	Ireland	SE	Sweden
DK	Denmark	IT	Italy		
ES	Spain	LU	Luxembourg		

Table 41: Industries

Industry Code	Industry	Industry Code	Industry
AIR	Airlines	ITC	Electronic Equipment,
ALU	Aluminum		Instruments &
ARO	Aerospace & Defense		Components
ATX	Auto Components	LIF	Life Sciences Tools
AUT	Automobiles		& Services
BLD	Building Products	MNX	Metals & Mining
BNK	Banks	MTC	Health Care Equipment
BTC	Biotechnology		& Supplies
BVG	Beverages	MUW	Multi & Water Utilities
CHM	Chemicals	OGR	Oil & Gas Refining
CMT	Communications Equipment		& Marketing
CNO	Casinos & Gaming	OGX	Oil & Gas Upstream
COM	Construction Materials		& Integrated
CON	Construction & Engineering	PRO	Professional Services
$\cos$	Personal Products	PUB	Media, Movies
CTR	Containers & Packaging		& Entertainment
DHP	Household Durables	REA	Real Estate
$\overline{\mathrm{DRG}}$	Pharmaceuticals	REX	Restaurants & Leisure
ELC	Electric Utilities		Facilities
$\operatorname{ELQ}$	Electrical Components	RTS	Retailing
	& Equipment	SEM	Semiconductors
FBN	Diversified Financial Services		& Semiconductor
	& Capital Markets		Equipment
FDR	Food & Staples Retailing	SOF	Software
FOA	Food Products	STL	Steel
FRP	Paper & Forest Products	TCD	Trading Companies
GAS	Gas Utilities		& Distributors
HEA	Health Care Providers	TEX	Textiles, Apparel
	& Services		& Luxury Goods
HOM	Homebuilding	THQ	Computers & Peripherals
HOU	Household Products		& Office Electronics
ICS	Commercial Services	TLS	Telecommunication
	& Supplies		Services
IDD	Industrial Conglomerates	TOB	Tobacco
IEQ	Machinery & Electrical	TRA	Transportation
	Equipment		& Transportation
IMS	Interactive Media, Services		Infrastructure
	& Home Entertainment	TRT	Hotels, Resorts
INS	Insurance		& Cruise Lines
		TSV	IT services

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#### \*Symbol Index

- $C_C^+(i)$  Positive closeness centrality of vertex i.
- $C_D^{abs}(i)$  Absolute degree centrality of vertex i.
- $C_D^{net}(i)$  Net degree centrality of vertex i.
- $C_D^+(i)$  Positive degree centrality of vertex i.
- $C_E^{abs}(i)$  Absolute eigenvector centrality of vertex i.
- $C_E^+(i)$  Positive eigenvector centrality of vertex i.
- $C_H^{abs}(i)$  Absolute harmonic centrality of vertex i.
- $C_H^+(i)$  Positive harmonic centrality of vertex i.
- d(i, j) Distance from nodes i to j.
- $\overline{d}(G)$  Average path length or average distance of graph G.
- diam(G) Diameter of graph G.
- h(G) Homophily ratio of graph G.
- $h^*(G)$  Homophily baseline ratio of graph G.
- m(G) Number of edges of the network G.
- Number of vertices of the network.
- rad(G) Radius of graph G.
- w(ij) Weight of the edge ij.
- w(G) Weight of the graph G.

### KOKKUVÕTTE

S&P 350 Euroopa indeksi aktsiate võrgustiku süvaanalüüs ja selle reageerimine COVID-19 pandeemiale

Antud uurimuse eesmärgiks on analüüsida võrgustiku topoloogiat Euroopa aktsiaturu, ennekõike S&P Euroopa 350 indeksisse kuuluvate aktsiate vastastikuste seoste põhjal. Indeks põhineb 350 firmal 16 erinevast arenenud riigist, vaadeldav ajavahemik on jaanuar 2016 kuni september 2020.a. (päevased andmed).

Uuringu fookus tuleneb finantskriiside majanduslikest mõjudest, mis on tabanud riike ja levinud üle maailma nagu näiteks 2008. aasta ülemaailmne finantskriis, andes võrgustike olemusele ja nende uurimisele üldise olemusliku tähtsuse. Samuti lisandus tõuge finatsvõrgustike ja süsteemse riski analüüsimiseks ning finantsvõrgustiku topoloogiast aru saamiseks.

Seitsmekümnendate aastate jooksul töötati välja mõned sotsiaalsete võrgustike uuringud, mis püüdsid mõista ja kaardistada inimsuhete käitumist, kohandades esmalt graafiteoorias ja statistikas kasutatavaid meetodeid. 21. sajandi alguses muutus võrgustikuanalüüs uueks potentsiaali omavaks uurimisvaldkonnaks tänu arvutuslikele edusammudele nagu andmesalvestusmahu suurenemine ja keerukate arvutuste läbiviimise võimalikkus. Selle distsipliini korral on silmatorkav ka lai rakendusvaldkonna spekter nagu bioloogia, genoomika, epidemioloogia, küberturvalisus, sotsioloogia, majandus või keeleteadus.

Pärast ülemaailmse finantskriisi poolt vallandatud kaskaadiefekti on ilmnenud palju uuringuid, mis kirjeldavad ja analüüsivad finantsšoki dünaamikat püüdes modelleerida, kuidas selle mõjud süsteemis levivad ja kuidas see hajub, mida tavaliselt nimetatakse vastavalt nakatumiseks ja imendumiseks.

Me teame, et finantsvõrgustik koosneb paljudest otsestest ja kaudsetest suhetest, moodustades keeruka süsteemi. Üheks võimaluseks sellist süsteemi analüüsida, on jagada see alamstruktuurideks ja uurida osade kaupa selle reaktsiooni süsteemsele riskile. Nii ongi mõned uuringud keskendunud finantsturgude omavahelistele suhetele, näiteks pankadevahelistele suhetele. Antud uurimuses kasutame sellist lähenemist Euroopa finantsturu käitumise ja struktuuri analüüsimiseks seoses COVID-19 pandeemiaga.

Käesolevas uurimuses kasutasime nii finantsökonomeetrilist kui ka võrguteooria lähenemist. Kuna saadaval olid päevased andmed, on ka loodud võrgustikud päevase dimensiooniga võimaldades lisada analüüsi dünaamilist aspekti läbi punktuaalse analüüsi ning selle ajalise muutumise. Finantsökonomeetrilise lähenemisviisi jaoks arvutasime logaritmitud tootluse igapäevaselt korrigeeritud sulgemishindadelt ja kasutasime mõjusat dünaamilise tingimusliku korrelatsiooni GARCH mudelit, kuhu lisasime ühise jälgitava teguri nagu Morgan Stanley Capital International World Indeksi. Indeksi põhjal arvutasime tingimuslikud korrelatsioonimaatriksid ning rakendades Gaussi graafilise mudeli algoritmi leidsime osalise korrelatsiooni maatriksid. Kaardistasime osalised korrelatsioonivõrgud, kasutades külgnevusmaatriksitena osalisi korrelatsioonimaatrikseid, teisisõnu, liikumis(muutumis)maatrikseid. Arvestades, et osalised korrelatsiooniväärtused jäävad miinus ühe ja ühe vahele, pidime andmete moonutamise vältimiseks eristama negatiivseid ja positiivseid väärtusi. Seega võtsime arvesse kolme erinevat tüüpi väärtusi võrguanalüüsiks - netoandmed (esialgsed osalise korrelatsiooni väärtused), absoluutandmed (osalise korrelatsiooni absoluutväärtused) ja positiivsed andmed (ainult positiivsed osalise korrelatsiooni väärtused).

Teostasime võrguanalüüsi seoses COVID-19 pandeemiaga, kus vaatlesime kogu ajavahemikule kõrval ka ükskuid ajalisi segmente jaanuarist 2016 kuni oktoobrini 2019, novembrist 2019 kuni veebruarini 2020, märtsist juunini 2020 ja juulist septembrini 2020.a. Selline lähenemine võimaldas meil uurida pandeemia mõju võrgustiku läbi. Võrk koosneb kahest eraldiseisvast hulgast, üks tippudest ja teine linkidest, kus lingid kaardistavad tippude vahelise seose. Selle töö jaoks on tipud aktsiaturuindeksi ettevõtted ja koos liikumised (muutumised) on lingid. Finantsvõrgu topoloogia tundmiseks uurisime kahte tüüpi parameetreid: globaalseid ja kohalikke.

Globaalsed parameetrid aitavad meil saada infot võrgustiku kahe kõige olulisema aspekti kohta, milleks on tipud, lingid ning nendevahelised seosed. Arvutasime iga võrgustiku servade arvu ja nende kogukaalu. Lisaks arvutasime välja keskmise kauguse, võrgustiku läbimõõdu ja raadiuse. Kuigi raadiust erialases kirjanduses sageli välja ei arvutata, aitab selle arvutamine koos läbimõõduga määrata vahemikku distantsil, mida vaja läbida, et šokk leviks kogu võrgustikus. Sel viisil saame minimaalse kauguse, mis on vajalik konkreetsest tipust ja mistahes suvalisest tipust kogu võrgustiku hõivamiseks.

Kohalikud parameetrid annavad infot tippude mõju kohta võrgustikus. Nende kohalike meetmete põhjal arvutasime välja astme, läheduse, harmoonilisuse, vahepealsuse ja omavektori tsentraalsused, et hinnata ettevõtete olulisust erinevate aspektide osas, nagu suhete arv, suhted ümbruskonnaga, asukoht võrgustikus. Iga tsentraalsusmõõdu jaoks määrame kindlaks kakskümmend ettevõtet, millel on kõrgeimad tsentraalsuse mõõdikute väärtused, s.t. tsentraalsuse mõõdiku kohta kõige mõjukamad ettevõtted. Lisaks sellele, võttes arvesse keskmisi tsentraalsuse väärtusi, määratlesime võrgustiku kõige olulisemad tööstusharud ja riigid. Võrgu kesksuse mõõdikute tundmine võimaldab näiteks keskpankadel fikseerida ülemaailmse süsteemselt olulise institutsiooni asukoha ning neid reguleerida.

Töös tutvustasime dünaamilise võrgustiku raamistiku kontseptsiooni. Kuna meil oli kokku 1201 koos muutuvat võrgustikku, aitas see uus struktuur meil tuvastada komponentide vaheliste seoste stabiilsust ajalises dimensioonis. Raamistiku võrgustikus arvutasime samad globaalsed ja kohalikud parameetrid, mis ülal mainitud. Globaalseid parameetreid kasutades suutsime hinnata suhete stabiilsust ja võrrelda seda COVIDiga seotud eri ajaetappide lõikes. Märkasime suhete stabiilsuse märkimisväärset suurenemist COVID-19 pandeemia ajal. Lisaks selgitame välja, millised ettevõtted olid kohalike parameetrite osas kõige mõjukamad kogu perioodi jooksul arvestades COVIDiga seotud ajaetappe.

Teostasime esmakordselt finantsvõrgustike analüüsi kontekstis homofiilse profiili analüüsi ning analüüsides ettevõtteid riikide ja sektorite kaupa leidsime ettevõtete vahel vägagi homofiilsed suhted. Põhjalikumaks analüüsimiseks võtsime arvesse osakorrelatsioonide erinevaid katkepunkte ja märkasime otsest seost osakorrelatsioonide ja homofiilsuse proportsiooni vahel võrgustikus, millel puhul tuvastasime kõrgemate korrelatsioonikordaja väärtuste korral suurema homofiilsuse. Raamistike osas oli homofiine käitumine veelgi tajutavam. Homofiilsus on sotsiaalvõrgustike analüüsi kontektsis väga populaarne mõiste, samas rahanduses on seda autori teadmiste kohaselt ainult mainitud ilma põhjalikumalt kasutamata.

Varasemates uuringutes on empiirilised tulemused näidanud, et pärast kriisi võrgustiku seotus suureneb; seevastu antud analüüsis käsitletud võrgustiku puhul, kasutades viitena COVID-19 šokki ja dünaamilise võrgustiku raamistikku, tuvastasime pandeemia ajal hoopiski suhete stabiilsuse kasvu.